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CIVIL RIGHTS—ANSWERING THE “MILLION DOLLAR” QUESTION: THE
MEANING OF “SEX” FOR THE PURPOSES OF TITLE IX, TITLE VII, AND THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE, AND ITS IMPACT ON TRANSGENDER
STUDENTS’ MEMBERSHIP IN FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Meet Henry Watson1 (“Watson”), an incoming freshman at a public
university. In August of 2019, Watson moved into his residence hall and
attended all of the freshman welcome-week events. Unlike the majority of
his peers, however, Watson is transgender.2 Specifically, Watson was born
female and now identifies as a male. His family accepts him, his friends
accept him, and he has been receiving cross-sex hormone therapy since he
turned eighteen.3
On his second day at school, Watson and his new friends, who are all
cisgender,4 attended the university’s student organization fair. All Registered Student Organizations (RSOs)5 participated in the fair, including fraternities6 and sororities.7 Watson and his new friends decided to go through
1. Henry Watson is fictional. His story is meant to evince the possible experiences
transgender students face when seeking to join a fraternal organization that fails to maintain a
clearly articulated membership policy.
2. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identities Definitions, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN,
https://www.hrc.org/resources/sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-terminology-anddefinitions (last visited Dec. 17, 2018) (“[Transgender is] [a]n umbrella term for people
whose gender identity and/or expression is different from cultural expectations based on the
sex they were assigned at birth.”).
3. Maria Hayon et al., Effects of Cross-Sex Hormone Treatment on Body Composition
in Transgender Persons, ENDOCRINE ABSTRACTS (May 19, 2018), https://www.endocrineabstracts.org/ea/0056/ea0056p966 (“Cross-sex treatments are used to masculinize [through
testosterone] or feminize [through estrogen] the bodies of female-to-male or male-to-female
transsexuals.”).
4. LGBTQ+ Definitions, TRANS STUDENT EDUC. RES., http://www.transstudent.org/
definitions/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2018) (“Adjective that means ‘identifies as their sex assigned at birth.’”).
5. A Registered Student Organization program is a university program that grants student groups official university recognition. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 669 (2010). As an RSO, the organization must meet certain
requirements and follow university policies; in return, the organization is afforded certain
benefits, such as space rental, use of school funds, and channels of communications. Id. at
669–70.
6. Fraternity and Sorority Terminology, UNLV, https://www.unlvfsl.com/greekdefinitions-and-terminology (last visited Dec. 17, 2018) (“The name that applies to all Greek
organizations characterized by a ritual, pin, and strong ties to friendship and moral principles.”).
7. Id. (“Informally, women’s fraternities are called sororities.”).
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formal recruitment8 and rush the fraternity Epsilon Phi Sigma (EPS).9 Watson’s friends chose EPS because they built relationships with older chapter
members during the first week of school. Watson, however, chose the group
because the fraternity’s creed10 and dedication to being different aligned
with his moral compass.11
Concerned about his eligibility to participate in recruitment because of
his status as a transgender male, Watson reached out to the Greek Life Office to confirm that the university permitted him to participate. The university recognized the fraternity as a traditional single-sex, all-male fraternity.
The state recognized Watson’s female status because Watson had female
genitals.12 University policy, however, recognized Watson as male based on
the gender he identified with at the time of admission.13 The Greek Life Office reassured Watson that the policy permitted him to participate in fraternity recruitment. Nevertheless, EPS had a national14 policy that vaguely de8. Id. Membership recruitment, commonly known as recruitment or rush, is the mutual
selection process that chapter members facilitate, and prospective members go through during
formal recruitment to learn more about one another. Id.
9. Tori Moore, Sigma Phi Epsilon Welcomes Transgender Members, ODYSSEY (Aug. 3,
2015), https://www.theodysseyonline.com/sigep-welcomes-transgender (“Sigma Phi Epsilon
is a national Fraternity built on brotherhood and fellowship of men. Any individual who
identifies as a man is welcome to seek membership in the Fraternity. This policy . . . should
not be interpreted as changing the all-male character of the Fraternity or as a waiver of the
Fraternity’s exempt status under Title IX.”). Unlike Sigma Phi Epsilon (hereinafter, generally, “SigEp”), the fictional fraternity EPS does not have a clear policy defining male or female
for membership purposes and signifies what a fraternity or sorority should not do. See infra
notes 14, 20 and accompanying text. Throughout this note I reference many aspects of SigEp’s policies, creed, and values as a model example of a fraternal organization and a fraternal organization’s clear and articulate membership policy defining male based on gender
identity. Moore, supra note 9; see infra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
10. Oscar E. Draper, Our Creed, SIGMA PHI EPSILON, https://www.sigep.org/about/
history-and-facts/our-ritual/our-creed/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2018) (examining Sigma Phi
Epsilon’s creed of Virtue, Diligence, and Brotherly Love stating, “I believe that Brotherly
Love must be given in order to be received, and that it cannot exist without triumph of the
principles of Virtue and Diligence, for these are essential parts of it.”).
11. History & Facts, SIGMA PHI EPSILON, https://sigep.org/about/history-and-facts/ (last
visited Mar. 14, 2019) (“Throughout the decades, the men of Sigma Phi Epsilon have practiced their values and embraced the stated desire of the Founders, ‘This Fraternity will be
different.’”).
12. M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 708 n.3 (D. Md. 2018) (using the term
birth-sex “to refer to the gender designations [as male or female] made at birth” and noting
“birth-sex . . . is usually based on the appearance of the person’s external genitalia.”).
13. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identities Definitions, supra note 2 (“Gender identity
[is] one’s innermost concept of self as male, female, a blend of both or neither [and] how
individuals perceive themselves and what they call themselves. One’s gender identity can be
the same or different from their sex assigned at birth.”).
14. National or international fraternal organizations are amalgamations of smaller, local
groups that follow their governance—called chapters—each of which is designated by a
special Greek name. See Fraternity and Sorority Terminology, supra note 6.
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fined the membership requirement as a male-only organization.15 Watson
and his friends, dressed in tailored suits, went to all of EPS’s recruitment
events, and by the end of the week, Watson and his friends knew every single member of the ninety-man chapter.
To extend a bid,16 EPS’s chapter by-laws required that all active members vote on potential new members17 (“PNM”), and each PNM must receive a “yes” vote from three-fourths of EPS members. After completing its
secret voting, EPS issued thirty-three bids and rejected seventy-seven
PNMs. On bid day, Watson and his friends visited the Greek Life Office and
learned that EPS extended offers to his friends but declined to extend Watson a bid. As Watson left the office, an administrative assistant handed Watson a button with a large red “T.”18 The button labeled him as another
transgender victim of a fraternal organization’s discriminatory membership
practices. EPS’s voting process is held in secret, making it impossible to
know the reason for Watson’s rejection.19 Various non-discriminatory factors could have played a role.20 But what is clear is the absence of a clearly
articulated policy addressing EPS’s stance on the admission of transgender
members.21
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”) prevents
discrimination on the basis of sex in all levels of education.22 What exactly
“sex” means for discriminatory purposes—and, particularly, a person’s

15. Stevie Tran, Transgender Membership and Title IX, FRATERNAL L., Nov. 2013, at 4,
5 (“Most organizations do not define the terms ‘male,’ ‘man,’ or ‘woman’ in their documents
. . . creat[ing] confusion for potential new members who are transgender [and who are legally
recognized as female but identify as male].”).
16. A bid is “[a] formal invitation to membership in a particular fraternity or sorority.”
Fraternity and Sorority Terminology, supra note 6.
17. A potential new member is a college student “who is participating in formal recruitment.” Id.
18. See, e.g., Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 530 (3d Cir. 2018)
(“Adopting [a policy requiring transgender students to use single-user facilities] would very
publicly brand all transgender students with a scarlet letter ‘T,’ and they should not have to
endure that as the price of attending their public school.”).
19. But see Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 520–28 (1960) (holding that “the
right of association” prevented cities from compelling the disclosure of membership lists by
only showing a subordinating interest).
20. Nance v. Rowan-Salisbury Bd. of Educ., 336 F. Supp. 3d 593, 593 (M.D.N.C. 2019)
(granting defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because the allegations
were not cognizable under Title IX and, even if they were, Plaintiffs failed to allege deliberate indifference).
21. The question remains how one would show deliberate indifference if he or she does
not know the reason for the denial. Man-or-male and woman-or-female are not defined in a
given organization’s policy, but, for transparency, they should be made to define these terms.
Tran, supra note 15, at 5.
22. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-56).
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transgender status—has not been made clear.23 The statute, however, has a
carve-out for traditionally single-sex social clubs24 and has made clear that
fraternities and sororities are not bound by Title IX.25 This raises some issues. For example, what protections are offered to transgender students,
such as Watson, who are victimized by the discriminatory practices of a
fraternal organization? And can fraternities and sororities offer membership
to transgender students without jeopardizing their single-sex status?26 Currently, no legal guidance exists to inform an organization’s ability to offer
inclusivity while maintaining single-sex status.27 This lack of guidance insulates organizations and allows them to remain static on the inclusion of students whose gender identities do not adhere to traditional male and female
distinctions.28 Some fraternities and sororities, however, have implemented
proactive policies that guarantee students are not discriminated against
based on their gender identities.29 Public and private universities have
adopted university policies that define discrimination on the basis of sex to
include gender identity.30 Other universities have adopted “all-comers” policies, which require RSOs across the university to grant membership to all

23. Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 288 & n.33 (W.D. Pa.
2017); see infra Section II.B.
24. § 1681(a)(6) (Westlaw).
25. Aivi Nguyen, How Much Power Does a Higher Ed Institution Have over Including
Transgender Students in Greek Life?, CAMPUS PRIDE (Dec. 23, 2016),
https://www.campuspride.org/resources/how-much-power-does-a-higher-ed-institution-have/
(“[T]here is a carve-out for fraternities and sororities, meaning fraternities that allow only
men as members and sororities that allow only women will not be in violation of Title IX.”).
26. Tran, supra note 15, at 4 (“Some organizations have interpreted Title IX’s . . . language as a requirement that they remain single sex and that they take a strong stance against
inclusion of anyone who may potentially violate their single-sex status, especially
transgender members.”).
27. Id.; see, e.g., Stevie Tran, Embracing Our Values: Title IX, the “Single-Sex Exemption,” and Fraternities’ Inclusion of Transgender Members, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 503, 518–
19 (2012) (“As a consequence of the lack of legal clarity, transgender individuals . . . experience complications when seeking membership in a fraternity.”).
28. Tran, supra note 15; see, e.g., CATHERINE E. LHAMON & VANITA GUPTA, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER ON TRANSGENDER STUDENTS
(2016),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ixtransgender.pdf.
29. Trans Inclusion Policy: Key Recommendations for Fraternities and Sororities,
CAMPUS PRIDE (May 9, 2017), https://www.campuspride.org/resources/trans-inclusionpolicy-key-recommendations-for-fraternities-sororities/ (depicting inclusive fraternal policies).
30. Title IX – UA Little Rock Policy for Sex- and Gender- Based Discrimination, Harassment, and Misconduct Complaints, and Complaint Retaliation, U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
(Oct. 10, 2018), https://ualr.edu/policy/home/facstaff/title-ix/ (“The University of Arkansas at
Little Rock is committed to providing an environment . . . that is free from . . . discrimination
based upon . . . sex, gender, sexual orientation, [and] gender identity.”).
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students.31 Harvard University in particular has taken a stance by issuing
sanctions against students participating in unrecognized single-sex organizations.32 Harvard’s new rule and other universities’ adoption of all-comers
policies have increased the awareness of the need for change in higher education33 but have also increased the awareness that the future of fraternities
and sororities as single sex is uncertain.34
This note addresses the application of Title IX, which prohibits an institution receiving federal funding from treating students differently on the
basis of sex in educational programs or activities with a carve-out for the
membership practice of single-sex social fraternities and sororities.35 This
note argues that: (1) discrimination on the basis of sex under Title IX includes transgender status and gender identity;36 (2) courts should recognize
transgender individuals as members of a quasi-suspect class entitled to a
heightened level of scrutiny;37 (3) Title IX does not apply to fraternities or
sororities, but it applies to the host university receiving federal funding; 38
and (4) fraternities and sororities are empowered to make policy changes
specifically permitting the inclusion of transgender students in the organizations.39 This note further addresses the impact of strict anti-discrimination
policies of host universities on single-sex organizations.40
Part II of this note provides background information on the development of Title IX and the legislative history’s impact on the exception for
single-sex organizations.41 This part also canvasses different jurisdictions’
approaches to defining “sex” under Title IX.42 Part II continues by addressing the three most influential anti-discriminatory laws that hinge on the definition of “sex,” including Title IX, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

31. See, e.g., Nondiscrimination FAQ, VAND. U., https://www.vanderbilt.edu/about/
nondiscrimination/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
32. See, e.g., HARV. UNIV., HARVARD COLLEGE HANDBOOK FOR STUDENTS 2018–19 at
132 (2019), https://handbook.fas.harvard.edu.
33. Timothy M. Burke, Two Lawsuits Filed Against Harvard, 158 FRATERNAL L., Jan.
2019, at 19; Daniel J. McCarthy, Ninth Circuit Upholds SDSU’s Nondiscrimination Policy,
117 FRATERNAL L., Sept. 2011, at 5 (“all-comers”).
34. Burke, supra note 33 (“There can be little doubt that these two cases are of major
importance and their outcomes may well impact far beyond how Harvard attempts to regulate
Greek Organizations.”).
35. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-56).
36. See infra Section III.A.1.
37. See infra Section III.A.2.
38. See infra Section III.B.
39. Nathan Arrowsmith & Stevie V. Tran, Title IX Empowers Fraternities to Include
Transgender Members, ESSENTIALS E-PUB., May 2013, at 1, 2.
40. See infra Section III.C.
41. See infra Section II.A.
42. See infra Section II.B.
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(“Title VII”),43 and the Equal Protection Clause (“EPC”) of the Fourteenth
Amendment.44 Part II further describes the common progressive scheme that
defines “sex” to include gender identity and identifies transgender individuals as members of a quasi-suspect class whose disparate treatment should
receive a heightened level of constitutional scrutiny.45 Part II concludes by
articulating three foundational legal pillars upon which fraternities and sororities are established.46
Part III argues that Title IX is inapplicable to fraternities and sororities
under the first pillar,47 and the organizations should create inclusive membership policies based on a student’s gender identity.48 This section further
addresses the second and third pillars, which are rooted in the Constitution’s
First Amendment grant to fraternal organizations49—specifically, the freedom of intimate and expressive association.50 Finally, Part III urges fraternities and sororities to capitalize on the three pillars and extend membership to
transgender individuals by following the modern practices of Title IX, Title
VII, and the EPC jurisprudence that are transgender inclusive.51
II. BACKGROUND
The fight for gender equality gained momentum fifty years ago and inspired the enactment of Title VII, Title IX, and multiple other antidiscrimination laws.52 But the fight is not over.53 This section begins with
the evolution of Title IX and the birth of the statutory exemption for social
fraternities and sororities.54 Next, this section addresses the jurisdictional
approaches to defining “sex” under Title IX, Title VII, and the EPC.55

43. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-56) (“[I]t shall be an unlawful practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual . . . of such individual’s race, color, sex, or national origin.”).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
45. See infra Section II.B.3.
46. See infra Section II.C.
47. Tran, supra note 27, at 517; see infra Section III.A.
48. Tran, supra note 27, at 517; see infra Section III.A.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see infra Section III.B.
50. See infra Section III.B; see, e.g., Tran, supra note 27, at 541.
51. See infra Section III.B.
52. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-56); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-56).
53. Nathan R. Cordle, Title IX at 45: The Evolution and Impact on LGBTQ+ Rights,
AM. BAR ASS’N (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/
publications/tyl/topics/sexual-orientation-gender-identity/title-ix-at-45-the-evolution-andimpact-on-lgbtq-rights/.
54. See infra Section II.A.
55. See infra Section II.B.
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The Birth of Title IX and the Fraternity/Sorority Exception

“Title IX56 . . . had a simple goal: to end sex discrimination in schools
that receive federal money.”57 Specifically, Congress enacted Title IX to
combat a distinct pattern of sex discrimination in schools.58 Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance,”59 including colleges and universities.60 In forty-six
years, the statute has “evolved into a more powerful tool used to combat
other forms of discrimination, harassment, and violence.”61 This fight, however, has not always had the support of law.62
Case law reveals a debate concerning gender equality in education in
terms of the statute’s application to a particular organization, the university
as a whole, or the department receiving federal financial support.63 The debate began in 1984 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Grove City College v. Bell, which expanded Title IX’s reach to include private universities
whose populations include students receiving federally funded scholarships.64 The holding, however, limited coverage under Title IX to the institution’s financial aid department.65 Many critics of Grove City College’s holding believed that the decision gutted Title IX by only requiring it to apply to
universities’ financial aid departments receiving direct funds.66

56. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, title IX, 86 Stat. 235, 373–75
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012)).
57. Karen Blumenthal, The Truth About Title IX, DAILY BEAST (May 22, 2012),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-truth-about-title-ix.
58. Kendyl L. Green, Note, Title VII, Title IX, or Both?, 14 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 5
(2017).
59. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-56).
60. Green, supra note 58.
61. Cordle, supra note 53.
62. See, e.g., Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 574–75 (1984); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 67 (1992); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 187–88
(1st Cir. 1996).
63. Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 574.
64. Id. at 573–76 (holding that private colleges, originally thought to be excluded from
Title IX’s reach, whose students receive federally funded Basic Educational Opportunity
Grants, now known as Pell Grants, are subject to Title IX).
65. Id. at 574–75.
66. Cordle, supra note 53 (“This ruling effectively eliminated Title IX’s application as
to . . . educational activities.”); Gender Equality in Athletics and Sports, FEMINIST MAJORITY
FOUND., http://www.feminist.org/sports/titleIX.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2018) (“The U.S.
Supreme Court gutted Title IX . . . [and allowed] [o]ther programs, such as athletics, that did
not receive federal funds, . . . free to discriminate on the basis of gender.”).
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Despite the new limitations placed on Title IX by Grove City College,
the decision inspired gender equality activists.67 Four years later, Congress
passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,68 which nullified the effects
of Grove City College “by outlawing sex discrimination throughout [the]
entire educational institution if any part of the institution received federal
funding.”69 The expansion of Title IX’s reach to all parts of an education
institution increased the success of Title IX in the fight against gender discrimination.70 The new law allowed individuals to sue and recover monetary
damages for Title IX violations,71 created gender equality in universities’
athletic programs,72 and guaranteed protection against sexual harassment
and sexual assault.73 Fraternity and sorority membership, however, is one
aspect of the university specifically shielded from Title IX’s reach.74
Shortly after its enactment in 1974, “the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare attempted to apply Title IX to fraternities [and sororities].”75 Many leaders of the single-sex organizations lobbied to demonstrate
the organizational value of single-sex entities and their status as independent
single-sex organizations.76 To address these issues, Senator Birch Bayh, the
principal architect of the new law, “proposed an amendment to Title IX,

67. Cordle, supra note 53 (“[T]he victory for Title IX opponents was short-lived.”).
68. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1687 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-56).
69. Gender Equality in Athletics and Sports, supra note 66; see also Hayley Macon et
al., Introduction to Title IX, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 417, 419 (2000) (“Within Title IX, Congress created a public remedy that permits the termination of federal funds when an institution providing educational programs discriminates against an individual on the basis of
sex.”); Cordle, supra note 53 (“Essentially, the Act reversed the effect of Grove City College,
and clarified that entire institutions are covered by Title IX if any program or activity within
the institution receives federal aid.”).
70. See generally Green, supra note 58, at 5–6.
71. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. at 67; see also Cordle, supra note 53 (“This effectively provided ‘teeth’ to the enforcement of Title IX.”).
72. See generally Cohen, 101 F.3d at 178 (providing equality for athletic programs that
are separated on the basis of sex).
73. See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ. 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999) (determining that
sexual harassment is covered under Title IX).
74. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1972), amended by 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(6)(B) (1974).
75. Tran, supra note 15, at 4; see Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City
Univ. of N.Y., 443 F. Supp. 2d 374, 388 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Legislative history reveals that
the exception for fraternities, sororities, and other traditionally single-sex organizations was
originally not included in Title IX of the Education Amendment.”) vacated, 502 F.3d 136 (2d
Cir. 2007).
76. Educational Support for: Unanimous Agreement X: Protecting the Right of NPC
Members to Remain Women-Only Organizations, NAT’L PANHELLENIC CONF., Nov. 2018, at
1, https://www.npcwomen.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2037/2017/10/Resolved-to-EducateUnanimous-Agreement-X.pdf [hereinafter Unanimous Agreement] (National Panhellenic
Conference (NPC) is an organization made up of twenty-six national sororities, an all woman’s group, that promoted the need for single-sex status as an organization.).
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exempting the membership practices of fraternal organizations from the
statute’s reach.”77 Senator Bayh unambiguously stated that:
[I]t was not my intent, and I do not believe it was the intent of
Congress that [T]itle IX be extended to organizations such as social fraternities and sororities. . . . I think it is important to point
out that this exemption covers only social Greek organizations; it
does not apply to professional fraternities or societies whose admissions practices might have a discriminatory effect upon the future career opportunities of a woman. (citation omitted) . . . .
[f]raternities and sororities have been a tradition in the country for
over 200 years . . . [and] must not be destroyed in misdirected effort to apply Title IX.78
In 1974, Congress adopted the amendment that carved out fraternities
and sororities.79 The language of the amendment articulated an unambiguous
exemption for social fraternities, social sororities, and a finite number of
other traditionally single-sex organizations from Title IX’s scope.80 However, as written, legal scholars have argued that “Congress specifically designated Title IX to bind the university, not the fraternal organization.”81
B.

The “Million Dollar” Question: What is “Sex”?

Title IX’s ban on sex-based discrimination created a guarantee to equal
opportunity for women in the educational system.82 However, as society has
moved beyond defining “sex” as meaning male or female, the question arises as to whether “sex” includes gender identity.83 In its final form, Title IX
77. Tran, supra note 15, at 4.
78. 120 CONG. REC. 39,992–93 (1974); see also Chi Iota Colony, 443 F. Supp. 2d at
388–89 (quoting Senator Birch Bayh) (“But § 1681 does not apply to the membership practices of a social fraternity or social sorority which is exempt from taxation under section
501(a) of Title 26, the active membership of which consists primarily of students in attendance at an institution of higher education.”); Tran, supra note 27, at 524.
79. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1972), amended by 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(6)(B) (1974); Nathan
Arrowsmith & Stevie Tran, Redefining Fraternity, PERSPECTIVE, Aug. 20, 2018, at 14, 14.
80. Chi Iota Colony, 443. F. Supp. 2d at 388 (“Also excluded from [Title IX] are ‘the
Young Men’s Christian Association, Young Women’s Christian Association, Girl Scouts,
[and] Boy Scouts . . . which are so exempt, the membership of which has traditionally been
limited to persons of one sex and principally to persons of less than nineteen years of age.’”).
81. Arrowsmith & Tran, supra note 39, at 1; see infra discussion Section III.B; see also
NAT’L PANHELLENIC CONFERENCE, NPC GENDER IDENTITY STUDY GROUP 13 (2017)
https://www.npcwomen.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2037/2017/11/Branded-GenderIdentity-August-2017.pdf.
82. See KARLA SCHULTZ, “ON THE BASIS OF SEX . . . “: TITLE IX COMPLIANCE IN A TIME
OF EVOLVING LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS OF “SEX” 1 (2017).
83. Id. (including females, males, and transgender individuals).
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was “established as an anti-discrimination measure guaranteeing that no one
would be excluded from federally assisted programs and activities regardless of gender.”84 This inclusive concept of gender discrimination gives rise
to the “million dollar” question85 of whether Title IX’s protection against
sex discrimination affords protection to members of the transgender community.86
Many courts have weighed in on the issue, but the Supreme Court has
yet to give a binding answer to the question.87 Changes in presidential administrations in the last decade added to this lack of clarity.88 Because there
is little guidance from the Court, each jurisdiction has answered this question for itself.89 This has resulted in the circuit courts being split on whether
to define “sex” in terms of Title IX violations as sex assigned at birth90 or in
a more encompassing manner to include gender identity.91
1.

The Lack of Clarity Has Created a Circuit Court Split: “Sex” v.
“Gender”

There is no uniform definition of “sex” as applied to discrimination
claims under Title IX.92 Because the words “sex” and “gender” are common84. Michael Lancaster, Intercollegiate Athletics and Title IX, ATHLETIC NETWORK,
https://www.athleticscholarships.net/title-ix-college-athletics-9.htm (last visited Nov. 3,
2018).
85. Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 288 n.33 (W.D. Pa.
2017). In Evancho, the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
articulated its appreciation for district counsel’s candor at oral argument for recognizing that
the “million dollar” questions are: what is the “applicable Equal Protection standard as to
classification based on transgender status” and what the term “sex” means for the purpose of
Title IX. Id. at 286.
86. See SCHULTZ, supra note 82, at 16. The case law suggests that the judicial approach
to interpreting anti-discrimination statues requires courts “to examine more expressly what is
meant by ‘sex’ under Title IX.” Id. “Does ‘sex’ mean only biological or birth sex? Does it
contemplate gender (e.g. traits that are stereotypically associated with being male or female)?
Or does it include sexual orientation, gender-identity, transgender status, and, if so, when?”
Id.
87. The Supreme Court of the United States has not addressed the precise issue of what
“sex” means in terms of Title IX’s application to discrimination claims and the determination
has been left to the discretion of the district courts. See Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 97 F.
Supp. 3d 657, 671 n.14 (W.D. Pa. 2015); see also, Evancho, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 286.
88. See Timothy M. Burke, More Uncertainty for Transgender Rights, 147 FRATERNAL
L., Mar. 2017, at 2, 2; see infra notes 175–82 and accompanying text.
89. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 671 n.14.
90. Id. at 671 (holding “sex” for Tile IX purposes is based on birth-sex, not gender identity).
91. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1049–50
(7th Cir. 2017) (noting that “sex” for Title IX purposes is based on gender identity, and thus
includes transgender status).
92. See id. at 1049; Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 671–72.
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ly misused interchangeably,93 a circuit split exists on the legal meaning of
“sex.”94 Courts have interpreted “sex” for Title IX purposes as having one of
two meanings.95 The first and most historical definition of “sex” is based on
a person’s genitalia at birth.96 The second category broadly defines “sex” to
include gender.97 “Determination of gender, unlike the determination of
‘birth-sex,’ is based on multiple factors.”98 The factors include: “‘chromosomes, hormone levels, internal and external reproductive organs, and gender identity,’ with gender identity being the ‘primary determinant.’”99 The
application of the second category’s factors results in a broader understanding of “sex” that logically includes transgender status,100 because by definition a transgender individual has a gender identity that is different from the
individual’s birth-sex.101 Despite the two definitional approaches, neither
offers a binding answer to the “million dollar” question of what encompasses “sex.”102
The courts’ lack of uniformity in defining “sex” under Title IX provides an opportunity to review how courts have interpreted other civil rights
laws as a source of guidance.103 The three most developed areas of the law
93. SCHULTZ, supra note 82, at 2 (“The Supreme Court has routinely, and without explanation, used the terms sex and gender interchangeably.”); see, e.g., N. Haven Bd. of Educ.
v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
94. Adrienne Spiegel, Supreme Court Grants Cert in Title VII Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity Cases, ONLABOR (Apr. 22, 2019), https://onlabor.org/supreme-court-grantscert-in-title-vii-sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-cases. The Supreme Court, however,
granted certiorari in three cases and will finally determine whether Title VII’s prohibition on
discrimination “because of sex” includes discrimination on the basis of a person’s sexual
orientation or a person’s gender identity. Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs., 723 F.
App’x 964, (11th Cir. 2018), cert. granted 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); Altitude Express, Inc. v.
Zarda, 883 F.3d 100, (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); EEOC v. R.G. &
G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted 139 S. Ct. 1599
(2019); Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s definitive answer on Title VII’s “scope would
likely inform judicial interpretation of the similarly worded prohibition against ‘sex’ discrimination in Title IX.” Christine J. Back & Jared P. Cole, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10229,
TITLE IX: WHO DETERMINES THE LEGAL MEANING OF “SEX”? 1 (2018).
95. See Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1050 (gender identity); Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 671
(birth-sex).
96. Adams v. Sch. Bd., 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (birth-sex).
97. See id. (including gender identity).
98. M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 708 (D. Md. 2018).
99. Id.
100. Adams, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 1298; M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 708.
101. Adams, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 1299 (“A transgender individual is someone who ‘consistently, persistently, and insistently’ identifies as a gender different than the sex they were
assigned at birth.”). Thus, a transgender individual by definition has a gender identity that is
different from the individual’s assigned sex. See, e.g., M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 714.
102. Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 288 n.33 (W.D. Pa.
2017).
103. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730, 746 (E.D. Va. 2018).
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that rely on the term “sex” in the discrimination context are Title IX, Title
VII, and the EPC.104 A Title IX claim hinges on the definition of “sex” because sex determines if a violation has occurred.105 Thus, it is important to
determine if a plaintiff’s transgender status is encompassed within the definition of “sex” because it is the key to whether a transgender person will
have a cause of action under Title IX.106 Title VII is one of the most influential areas of civil rights law and provides significant guidance on how to
define “sex” for Title IX purposes.107 The EPC does not particularly give
guidance to the definition of “sex” in terms of Title IX.108 The lower courts’
interpretations of the EPC, however, have explored the relationship between
sex, gender, and what classification is legally given to transgender individuals because gender is a protected class that receives a heightened level of
judicial review under this Clause.109
2.

The Hinging Effect of Defining “Sex”: Title IX, Title VII, & the
Equal Protection Clause

To state a Title IX claim, a plaintiff must allege that: “(1) he or she was
excluded from participation in an educational program because of his or her
sex; (2) that the educational institution was receiving federal financial assistance at the time of his or her exclusion; and (3) that the improper discrimination caused the plaintiff harm.”110 The cause of action hinges on what
“sex” means, but as denoted above, the Supreme Court’s lack of an answer
leads to reliance on other civil rights laws for guidance.111
a.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s interpretation of
“sex”

To resolve ambiguities and for guidance in interpreting “sex” in Title
IX discrimination claims, lower courts look at interpretations of “sex” in
Title VII employment discrimination claims.112 This makes sense.113 Title IX

104. NAT’L CTR. TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS ON GENDER IDENTITY
DISCRIMINATION AS SEX DISCRIMINATION 1 (2018).
105. Grimm, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 746.
106. Id.
107. M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 713 (D. Md. 2018).
108. Id.
109. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011); M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. 3d at
721.
110. Grimm, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 747.
111. Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 296 (W.D. Pa. 2017).
112. Grimm, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 744; M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 713; Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1047–49 (7th Cir. 2017).
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protects students and employees in all levels of academia, and Title VII protects employees in the workforce.114 “The ‘on the basis of sex’ language of
Title IX is similar, but not identical, to the ‘because of’ and ‘based on’ one’s
sex (and race, color, national origin, and religion) language found in Title
VII.”115 To determine the meaning of sex discrimination for purposes of
Title IX, federal courts have routinely looked to the parallel and narrow judicial interpretations of Title VII.116 Specifically, “[g]iven the lack of definition within . . . [Title IX], and recognizing that a number of courts have
struggled with this exact question,” the fact that “the term ‘sex’ as used in
Title IX is ambiguous as applied to transgender students” requires courts to
look to Title VII for guidance.117
In evaluating Title VII case law, however, there is no definitive answer
on whether discrimination on the basis of sex includes transgender individuals, because, like Title IX,118 the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue
directly.119 Various lower courts have either not addressed the issue or are
split on whether transgender falls under Title VII’s definition of sex.120 Despite the Supreme Court’s inaction in addressing the specific issue, the
“Court has constructed a framework for addressing sex discrimination

113. Tina Sciocchetti & Zachary C. Osinski, Uneven Recognition of Gender Identity
Discrimination Claims Under Title VII and Title IX, NIXON PEABODY (Apr. 9, 2018),
https://www.nixonpeabody.com/-/media/Files/Alerts/2018-April/uneven-recognition-ofgender-identity-discrimination-042018.ashx (“Courts rulings concerning Title VII’s application in cases . . . will, in turn, affect how courts view similar Title IX claims given the parity
with which courts typically interpret ‘sex discrimination’ under both federal laws.”).
114. Green, supra note 58, at 3.
115. SCHULTZ, supra note 82, at 2. Specifically, Title IX is written as a broad prohibition
on discrimination followed by narrow exceptions. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544
U.S. 167, 175 (2005). Title VII, however, details the specific conduct that constitutes discrimination. Id.
116. Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 296 (W.D. Pa. 2017)
(“As to the interpretation of Title IX, its prohibition of discrimination based on sex is generally viewed as being parallel to the similar proscriptions contained in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of ‘sex’ in the employment
context. These statutes’ [Title VII and Title XI] prohibitions on sex discrimination are analogous.”).
117. Adams v. Sch. Bd., 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1321 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (birth-sex).
118. See supra Section II.B.1.
119. M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 713 (D. Md. 2018) (“The Supreme
Court has never addressed the issue.”). But, as noted previously, the Court may once and for
all answer the question. See supra authority cited at note 92 and accompanying text.
120. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730, 744 (E.D. Va. 2018); see
also Sam Williamson, G.G. Ex Rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board: Broadening
Title IX’s Protections for Transgender Students, Note, 76 MD. L. REV. 1102, 1119 (2017).
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claims brought by individuals who fail to conform to social expectations for
their gender group.”121
Early Title VII case law relied on the plain meaning of “sex” to mean
biological male or biological female.122 The court noted “if the term ‘sex’ as
it is used in Title VII is to mean more than biological male or biological
female, the new definition must come from Congress.”123 Justice Scalia,
however, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, notably observed that
Congress intended to strike at the “entire spectrum” of discrimination and
held Title VII bars all sex-based classifications.124
In the late 1980s, the lower courts’ approaches to anti-discrimination
statutes evolved125 and began to interpret “sex” for Title VII purposes to go
beyond birth-sex.126 For example, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,127 “the
Court found that failure to promote a cisgender woman because she was too
‘macho’ could constitute sex discrimination”128 based on sex stereotyping,
thus creating a Title VII framework that recognizes sex discrimination
claims brought by individuals who fail to conform to social or gender
norms.129 The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits recognize that a gender-stereotyping allegation “generally is actionable sex
discrimination under Title VII”130 based on the logic of Price Waterhouse.131
Other circuits disagree, noting that the sex stereotyping framework creates difficulty for courts distinguishing between discrimination on the basis
121. Grimm, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 744 (stating that the Supreme Court created an expansive
sex stereotyping framework and that “the Price Waterhouse Court agreed that Title VII
barred discrimination not only based on a plaintiff’s gender, but based on ‘sex stereotyping’
because the plaintiff had failed to act in accordance with gender stereotypes associated with
women [or men].”).
122. Ulane v. E. Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that discrimination under Title VII does not extend to the transitional status of a person but is based on the
individual’s biological sex; arguably overruled by Price Waterhouse).
123. Id. at 1087 (discussing the legislative history of Title VII and the last-minute inclusion of sex).
124. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78–80 (1998) (“[S]tatutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by
which we are governed.”); M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 714 (D. Md. 2018).
125. SCHULTZ, supra note 82, at 2.
126. Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 296 (W.D. Pa. 2017).
127. 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
128. Williamson, supra note 120, at 1112–13.
129. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251; see, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853
F.3d 339, 351–52 (7th Cir. 2017); Anonymous v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 200–01
(2d Cir. 2017); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2009); Nichols
v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001); Higgins v. New Balance
Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999).
130. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730, 745 (E.D. Va. 2018).
131. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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of sex stereotyping and transsexuality;132 “when the plaintiff is transsexual,
direct evidence of discrimination based on sex stereotypes may look a great
deal like discrimination based on transsexuality itself, a characteristic that,
in and of itself, . . . is unprotected by Title VII.”133 The circuits that follow
this logic base their holdings on precedent that predates Price Waterhouse.134 Courts have noted that Price Waterhouse’s holding, “by its own
terms, took an expansive view as to the forms of sex discrimination that
Title VII was meant to reach, expressly leaving open the possibility of other
forms of gender stereotyping.”135 For instance, numerous courts have held
that Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex stereotyping
is expansive and includes discrimination based on a person’s transitioning
status,136 gender nonconformity,137 and sexual orientation.138
As society evolves, it appears that courts are beginning to establish a
modern, expansive view of Title VII that includes discrimination on the basis of transgender status, because “by definition, transgender persons do not
conform to gender stereotypes.”139 “Even though the law is making progress,
the long line of cases addressing discrimination against transgender employees does not provide a ‘stable basis’ to protect against discrimination.”140
Legal scholars agree that there is a “judicial consensus that Title IX’s ‘because of sex’ language, as with Title VII, incorporates discrimination based
on gender nonconformity and sex stereotyping.”141 The First, Fourth, Sixth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits made progressive court rulings that assist in the
fight against gender discrimination by providing a thorough analysis of the
reasons discrimination on the basis of transgender status is per se sex dis132. M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 714, n.7 (D. Md. 2018) (“The only
Courts of Appeals that arguably held to the contrary are the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits’ rulings that transgender status, taken alone, is not entitled to Title VII protections.”);
see Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007); Ulane v. E. Airlines,
742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th
Cir. 1982).
133. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305 (D.D.C. 2008).
134. See M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 714–15, 715 n.7.
135. Grimm, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 744.
136. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (discussing various
findings related to Title VII, but ultimately addressing discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith v. City of
Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509
(D. Conn. 2016).
137. Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, 641 F. App’x 883, 891 (11th Cir. 2016);
Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 F. App’x. 492, 493 (9th Cir. 2009).
138. Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 296 (W.D. Pa. 2017).
139. M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 714. (quoting Finkle v. Howard Cty., 12 F. Supp. 3d 780,
787–88 (D. Md. 2014)).
140. Tran, supra note 27, at 517. Similarly, the case law fails to provide a stable basis for
transgender students in the academic setting. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
141. SCHULTZ, supra note 82, at 8.
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crimination.142 “However, there is no agreement about whether one’s status
as a heterosexual, gay, lesbian, transgender, or bisexual person creates a
valid Title IX claim.”143 Until Congress acts or the Supreme Court makes a
decision on the matter, the precedent established is binding authority only in
each individual jurisdiction and merely persuasive authority for the remaining circuits who have either ruled in the alternative or have not addressed
the issue thus far.144 Title VII’s jurisprudence is not a stable basis for protecting transgender individuals from discrimination or answering the “million dollar” question.145
b.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution’s interpretation of “sex”

Unlike Title VII, the Supreme Court fails to reference the Equal Protection Clause (“EPC”) sex discrimination jurisprudence to interpret “sex” in a
cause of action under Title IX.146 Two circuit courts, however, found a “consistent purpose” underlying a sex-stereotyping theory in Price Waterhouse
that connects Title IX, Title VII, and the EPC.147 Regardless, a plaintiff can
bring both a Title IX and an EPC claim contemporaneously,148 and because
the Court has not issued guidance on how the law applies to transgender
people in either area, it is important to reference the EPC when discussing
Title IX jurisprudence.149
EPC violations hinge on the level of judicial review the claim receives.150 The EPC provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”151 and “is essentially
142. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730, 745–46 (E.D. Va. 2018)
(“Accordingly, allegations of gender stereotyping are cognizable Title VII sex discrimination
claims and, by extension, cognizable Title IX sex discrimination claims.”).
143. SCHULTZ, supra note 82, at 8.
144. See Grimm, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 744.
145. Tran, supra note 27, at 517.
146. M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 718 (D. Md. 2018).
147. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1050
(7th Cir. 2017); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011).
148. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 258 (2009) (holding that “Title
IX was not meant to be an exclusive mechanism for addressing gender discrimination in
schools or a substitute . . .” and students can bring a Title IX claim and EPC simultaneously).
149. M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 719.
150. Id. at 718; see also Jody Feder, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30253, SEX
DISCRIMINATION AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW 1
(2018) (“Despite the fact that the Court’s analysis of sex discrimination challenges under the
Constitution differs from its analysis of sex discrimination under . . . [Title VII and Title IX],
it is apparent that the Court is willing to refine its standard of review under both schemes to
accommodate the novel claims.”).
151. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”152 The
Court has established a three-tier framework that is used to root out unfair
prejudices.153 The three-tiered framework includes: (1) rational basis review;
(2) heightened or intermediate scrutiny, applied to a quasi-suspect class; and
(3) strict scrutiny, applied to a suspect class.154
Sex is considered a quasi-suspect classification.155 The Court applies an
“intermediate” level of scrutiny to classifications based on sex, “because sex
‘frequently bears no relation to the ability to perform or contribute to society.’”156 If the Court determines that “sex” includes gender identity, a heightened level of scrutiny should apply in determining if illegal discrimination
has occurred on the basis of a person’s transitioning status.157 But, much like
Title IX, the Court offers no guidance to determine whether transgender
status is included in its sex discrimination analysis under the EPC.158 Thus, a
split in the lower courts’ interpretations of “sex” exists.159 The Court recognizes criteria to consider in determining whether a state-classified group of
people is entitled to suspect or quasi-suspect class status.160 The criteria include: “(1) whether the class has historically been subject to discrimination;”161 (2) “whether the class has a defining characteristic that bears a relation to ability to perform or contribute to society;”162 (3) “whether the class
exhibits obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define the
class as a discrete group;”163 and (4) “whether the class is a minority or politically powerless.”164 Multiple courts have held that transgender individuals

152. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
153. Susannah Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 739, 742
(2014).
154. Id.
155. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686–87 (1973).
156. M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 718; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (holding that the state bears the burden of demonstrating that its
proffered justification for the use of a sex-based classification is “exceedingly persuasive”).
157. Mudasar Khan et al., Eighteenth Annual Review of Gender and the Law: Annual
Review Article: Challenges Facing LGBTQ Youth, 18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 475, 479 (2017).
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., F.V. v. Barron, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1146 (D. Idaho 2018) (holding that
transgender individuals are subject to a heightened level of scrutiny); Evancho v. PineRichland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 293 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (same); M.A.B., 286 F. Supp.
3d 704, 722 (quasi-suspect class).
160. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730, 749 (E.D. Va. 2018).
161. Id. (citing Bowen v. Gillard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (“As a historical matter, they
have not been subjected to discrimination.”)).
162. Id. (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440–41 (1985)).
163. Id. (citing Bowen, 483 U.S. at 602).
164. Id. (citing Bowen, 483 U.S. at 602.)
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meet all four factors of the criteria and are therefore part of a quasi-suspect
class. 165
In determining if the first prong is met, the lower courts explain that
“there is no doubt”166 that transgender people have been historically subject
to discrimination and systemic oppression on the basis of their gender identities.167 “Transgender people . . . suffer endemic levels of physical and sexual violence, harassment, and discrimination” in education, housing, and
healthcare access.168 The lower courts make it clear that transgender status
has no bearing on a transgender individual’s ability to contribute to society,
meeting the second prong.169 “The most controversial of the elements required [for transgender status] to be a suspect class is the argument of immutability.”170 The courts and the medical community debate whether a person’s transgender status is immutable.171 Courts that have held sex is not
immutable reason that sex is based on the traditional concept of birth-sex.172
Other lower courts, however, give deference to “[e]xperts [that] agree . . .
gender identity has a ‘biological component,’ . . . and is deep-seated, set
early in life, and impervious to external influences.”173 Thus, courts reason
that being transgender is immutable and encompasses “distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group,” meeting the third prong.174
165. Id. at 749–50; M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 720 (D. Md. 2018);
Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139–40 (S.D.N.Y 2015).
166. Grimm, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 749 (citing Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1
Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1051; M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 720).
167. Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63563, at *31
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2018), vacated, 926 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2018).
168. Id. at *31(“According to a nationwide survey conducted by the National Center for
Transgender Equality in 2015, 48 percent of transgender respondents reported being denied
equal treatment, verbally harassed, and/or physically attacked in the past year because of
being transgender . . . .”).
169. Id. at *32 (“Discrimination against transgender people clearly is unrelated to their
ability to perform and contribute to society.”); Grimm, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 749–50.
170. Kylee Reynolds, Unmuting Immutability: How Strict Scrutiny for Transgender People is Changing the Game, PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF.: JLIA BLOG (May 22, 2018),
https://sites.psu.edu/jlia/unmuting-immutability-how-strict-scrutiny-for-transgender-peopleis-changing-the-game/ (“While the medical community has argued that being transgender is
something that cannot be changed courts have not taken a stance on the issue.”).
171. Id.
172. Ulane v. E. Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); Johnston v. Univ. of Pitt.,
97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 671 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
173. Karnoski, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63563, at *33.
174. Id.; see, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375,
377 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The real question is whether discrimination on the basis of the class’s
distinguishing characteristics amounts to an unfair branding or resort to prejudice, not necessarily whether the characteristic is immutable.”); M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 3d
704, 720 (D. Md. 2018); Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y.
2015).
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The lower courts have taken a broad approach to determining if
transgender people are politically powerless.175 There has been a visible decrease in political power of transgender individuals in recent years because,
as a group, transgender people “lack the relative political power to protect
themselves from wrongful discrimination.”176 The exact number is not
known, but it is estimated that “transgender people make up less than one
percent of the nation’s adult population.”177 In Karnoski v. Trump, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington furthers the
argument that the transgender community lacks political power by giving
deference to the lack of protections afforded to transgender people under
state and federal laws.178 “Fewer than half of the states have laws that explic175. Karnoski, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63563, at *33.
176. Id. at *34.
177. Id.
178. Id. Specifically, the district court addressed the constitutionality of President
Trump’s ban on transgender individuals from serving in the U.S. Military. Id.; see Donald
Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 7:55 AM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/890193981585444864; see Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 8:04 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
890196164313833472 (“After consultation with my Generals and military experts, please be
advised that the United States Government will not accept or allow . . . [t]ransgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military.”). In March 2019, President Trump authorized Secretary of Defense James Mattis to modify this policy based on a forty-four-page
report he produced—addressing the medical condition gender dysphoria, rather than
transgender status. Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63563, at
*5 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2018), vacated, 926 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2018) (“With few exceptions, the plan excludes from military service people ‘with a history or diagnosis of gender
dysphoria’ and people who ‘require or have undergone gender transition.’ The plan provides
that transgender people may serve in the military only if they serve in their ‘biological
sex.’”). The district court identified transgender people as a suspect class and held that the
ban failed to survive strict scrutiny and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. at *6 (striking
down Defendants’ motion to dissolve a nationwide preliminary injunction and upholding the
injunction preventing the Defendants from taking any action or attempting to exclude
transgender individuals from serving in the military). In June 2019, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, vacated and remanded the decision. Karnoski v.
Trump, 926 F.3d 1180, 1208 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that the Defendants demonstrated a
significant change in fact by modifying the policy and that the district incorrectly applied
strict scrutiny). The Ninth Circuit remanded the decision with the direction to provide deference to the military and to apply an intermediate level of scrutiny stating: “We conclude that
the 2018 Policy on its face treats transgender persons differently than other persons, and
consequently something more than rational basis but less than strict scrutiny applies.” Id. at
1201. The district court had expanded anti-discrimination laws to transgender people by
identifying transgender people as a protected class and applying strict scrutiny. Karnoski,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63563 at *34–35. The circuit court’s decision arguably diminished
the protections the district court provided to transgender people. Karnoski, 926 F.3d at 1201.
Regardless, the Ninth Circuit provided some clarity by directing the district court to apply
intermediate scrutiny, thus identifying transgender people as a quasi-suspect class. Id. The
progressive litigation in Karnoski v. Trump further supports the notion that federal and state
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itly prohibit discrimination against transgender people.”179 Much like state
laws, the federal laws are limited in the protections afforded to members of
the transgender community.180 The district court in Karnoski also noted that
the “recent actions by President Trump’s administration have removed many
of the limited protections afforded by federal law.”181 These actions, coupled
with the fact that “openly transgender people are vastly underrepresented in
and have been ‘systematically excluded from the most important institutions
of self-governance,’” such as Congress and the federal judiciary, give
weight to a finding of transgender people being politically powerless.182
Following the lower courts’ jurisprudence and using the four-factor criteria, transgender people constitute a quasi-suspect class.183 The courts’
identification of transgender people as an independent quasi-suspect class,
however, are not consistent or controlling precedent.184 But the issue is
pressing, and, as lower courts continue to make decisions on the issue, it
may lead the Supreme Court to determine what is encompassed within the
term “sex”—thus, answering the “million dollar” question.185
3.

Agencies’ Regulations and Interpretations of “Sex”

Courts give great deference to other civil rights laws to interpret “sex”
for the purposes of Title IX.186 However, “[t]he statutory language is bold
and aspirational . . . Title IX’s particulars have mostly been defined by subsequent agency regulations and interpretations.”187 The Office of Civil
Rights (OCR) of the United States Department of Education (DOE) is the
laws bolster the political powers of the transgender community. See generally Karnoski v.
Trump, 926 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2019); Karnoski, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63563 at *34–35.
Furthermore, the district court and the Ninth Circuit’s opinions offer an informative analysis
on the proper classification for transgender individuals and the correlating standard of review
to be applied. See infra Section III.A.2.
179. Karnoski, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63563 at *34.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at *34–35; see, e.g., M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 719–20 (D.
Md. 2018); Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y 2015).
184. Karnoski, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63563 at *35; Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 97
F. Supp. 3d 657, 671 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
185. Despite the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance on the issue and the absence of binding precedent, “when an issue is fairly and squarely presented to a District Court, that Court
must address it.” Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 286–88 (W.D.
Pa. 2017). “Dodging the question is not an option.” Id. at 286.
186. See supra Section II.B.
187. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 414, 435 (D. Conn. 2013) (citing
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 893 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that Title IX “sketches
wide policy lines, leaving the details to regulating agencies.”)).
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federal agency tasked with enforcing Title IX and has released multiple
Dear Colleague Letters (DCL) and other materials for guidance to determine
what “sex” means for purposes of the statute.188 The DOE, however, has
created an inconsistent and shifting interpretational approach in defining
“sex” under Title IX.189 Subsequently, the courts have more carefully and
explicitly considered the “legislative history and intent behind Title VII and
Title IX, and whether (or how much) judicial deference should be given to
federal agencies especially in the absence of formal rulemaking.”190
Specifically, the DOE caused more confusion in what exactly “sex”
encompasses in terms of Title IX by issuing and repealing inconsistent
DCLs and guidance materials.191 In 2016, during the Obama Administration,
the DCLs expanded Title IX’s protection and “advised [schools] that Title
IX required ‘access to sex-segregated facilities based on gender identity.’”192
In February of 2017, however, the Trump Administration revoked the
Obama DCLs on the basis that they “did not ‘contain extensive legal analysis or explain how the position is consistent with the express language of
Title IX, nor undergo any formal public process.’”193 The new DCLs give
deference to each state to determine what “sex” means and to establish educational policy.194
According to some legal scholars, the new DCLs seem to be geared
toward the use of facilities and do not impact the application of the singlesex exception for fraternities and sororities to include transgender members.195 The scholars believe the DCLs generated by the Obama Administration constitute the clearest guidance given to fraternities and sororities on
membership practices concerning gender identity.196
The DCLs make clear that “Title IX does not apply to the membership
practices of social fraternities and sororities.”197 The DCLs, however, do not
offer a firm answer to whether fraternities and sororities can offer inclusivity

188. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 435–52; Back & Cole, supra note 94, at 3.
189. SCHULTZ, supra note 82, at 11; see, e.g., Back & Cole, supra note 94, at 3.
190. SCHULTZ, supra note 82, at 11.
191. Burke, supra note 88, at 3; DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 28.
192. Burke, supra note 88, at 2.
193. Back & Cole, supra note 94, at 3. The Trump administration rescinded the DCLs
following the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas’s decision issuing a nationwide preliminary injunction on the basis that the “guidance was ‘legislative and
substantive,’ and thus formal rule making should have occurred prior to the adoption of any
such policy.” Burke, supra note 88, at 3; see, e.g., Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d
810 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
194. Burke, supra note 88, at 3.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 28, at 4; Burke, supra note 88, at 3.
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while maintaining single-sex status.198 The inapplicability of Title IX to fraternities and sororities and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution establish the three legal foundational pillars discussed below199 and
answer the question for fraternities and sororities.200 The pillars provide fraternal organizations “extensive latitude under Title IX” 201 to choose how
each chapter or national organization defines male or female for membership purposes202 while safeguarding the organization’s single-sex status.203
C.

Three Pillars Establishing the Legal Foundation for Fraternities and
Sororities

Legal scholar Stevie Tran articulates three legal pillars that establish
the foundation on which fraternities and sororities exist today: (1) the statutory exemption from Title IX, or more accurately referred to as the inapplicability of Title IX to fraternities and sororities; (2) the constitutional
rights to intimate association; and (3) the constitutional right to expressive
association.204 The three pillars establish that fraternities and sororities are
legally permitted to define the membership criteria of each organization on a
national, state, or local level.205 Furthermore, the three pillars establish the
freedom of fraternities and sororities to determine how each organization
defines “sex” for membership purposes and “whether the inclusion of
transgender members aligns with the purpose for which their organizations
exist.”206
1.

The First Foundational Pillar: Title IX’s Inapplicability to Social
Fraternities and Social Sororities

Understanding the application of Title IX to the host university and not
the specific single-sex organization is critical.207 The plain language of Title
IX is misleading and causes members of the fraternal world to believe that
Title IX provides legal protection to “single-sex” fraternities and sorori-

198. Burke, supra note 88, at 3; Tran, supra note 27, at 517.
199. U.S. CONST. amend. I; 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 11656).
200. Tran, supra note 27, at 527; see infra Section II.C.
201. Tran, supra note 27, at 525, 527; see also Sean P. Callan, Non-Binary Gender in a
Binary System, 151 FRATERNAL L., Nov. 2017, at 4, 5.
202. Callan, supra note 201, at 5.
203. Tran, supra note 15, at 5–6; see supra Section II.C.; infra Section III.B.
204. Tran, supra note 27, at 540–41 (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 541.
206. Id. at 525; Tran, supra note 15, at 5.
207. NAT’L PANHELLENIC CONFERENCE, supra note 81, at 13.
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ties.208 The belief is centered on the idea that fraternal organizations must
adhere to the constructs of male-only or female-only to maintain single-sex
status.209 However, two scholars, Stevie Tran and Nathan Arrowsmith, argue
that, as written, the protections of Title IX do not protect or bind fraternities
or sororities.210 The scholars’ argument rests on the premise that “visibly
missing from the language . . . is any mention of ‘single sex.’”211 The provision states that “this section shall not apply to membership practices-- (A) of
a social fraternity or social sorority which is exempt from taxation . . . the
active membership of which consists primarily of students in attendance at
an institution of higher education.”212 The scholars bolster this argument by
addressing the congressional record of Title IX which contains a letter from
Department of Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger that states,
“[o]bligations under Title IX run to the recipient institution of higher education and not to a fraternal organization unless the organization itself received
Federal financial assistance.”213
The congressional record and the language of the provision reflect the
statutory scheme and prove that Congress designated Title IX to bind each
university that receives federal funding and chooses to recognize single-sex
fraternities and sororities on that particular campus.214 Universities, however, are not required to recognize fraternities or sororities.215 “Rather, it allows universities to recognize single-sex social fraternities without risking
the university’s federal funding” and leaves the fraternal organization unscathed by Title IX’s application.216 The inapplicability of Title IX to fraternities and sororities does not provide any rights to individuals seeking membership or impose any requirements on the fraternal organizations’ member-

208. Id.
209. Arrowsmith & Tran, supra note 78, at 15.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a)(6)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-56).
213. Arrowsmith & Tran, supra note 78, at 15.
214. NAT’L PANHELLENIC CONFERENCE, supra note 81, at 13; see also Arrowsmith &
Tran, supra note 78, at 15 (“Congress specifically designated Title IX to bind the educational
institution, not a fraternal organization. Title IX’s statutory scheme focuses solely on the
educational institution, in that a college or university that receives federal funding must comply with Title IX throughout the institution and within its education programs and activities . .
. [it] permits a college or university to recognize social fraternal organizations without the
risking loss of federal funds.”).
215. NAT’L PANHELLENIC CONFERENCE, supra note 81, at 13 (stating that the 2016 DCL
confirms that Title IX applies to the host university and not the fraternal organization). Despite President Trump’s repeal of the 2016 DCLs, the DCLs are the only guidance fraternal
organizations have received in terms of transgender membership. Id.
216. Id.
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ship practices.217 Title IX’s inapplicability, however, is only the first foundational pillar that supports today’s fraternal organizations.218
2.

The Second and Third Foundational Pillars: The First Amendment Right to Intimate Associational Relationships and Expressive
Associational Relationships

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution establishes the
freedom of association.219 The associational freedoms grant fraternities and
sororities the right to discriminate in the fraternal organizations’ membership practices.220 The associational rights are the freedom of intimate associational relationships and expressive associational relationships.221 This establishes the second and third foundational pillars. 222 The two associational
freedoms are not explicitly set out in the First Amendment,223 but the “Court
has held that such associations are ‘central to our constitutional scheme’ and
are ‘a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights.’”224
The Court established corresponding frameworks to determine whether a
fraternal organization meets the associational status that affords it First
Amendment protections.225 “To determine whether an associational relationship is entitled to constitutional protection, courts assess, ‘where that relationship’s objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most
intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments.’”226
The second legal foundational pillar afforded to fraternities and sororities is the right to intimate associations.227 The right to intimate associations
is deeply rooted in the Bill of Rights and is an “element of personal liberty”228 and “human relationships [that] must be secured against undue intru217. Arrowsmith & Tran, supra note 79, at 16.
218. Tran, supra note 29, at 540–41.
219. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958) (recognizing the right to expressive association).
220. Arrowsmith & Tran, supra note 79, at 16.
221. Id.
222. Tran, supra note 27, at 540–41.
223. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S 479, 483 (1965)
(recognizing the right to intimate association); NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449 (1958) (recognizing the right to expressive association); Timothy M. Burke, Even the
Unpopular Have Associational Rights, 125 FRATERNAL L., Nov. 2017, at 3.
224. Tran, supra note 27, at 541 ((quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618
(1984) (establishing the framework for intimate associational rights); Boy Scouts of Am. v.
Dale, 540 U.S. 640, 659 (2000) (establishing the framework for expressive associational
rights)).
225. Arrowsmith & Tran, supra note 79, at 16.
226. Id. (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618).
227. Tran, supra note 27, at 541.
228. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
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sion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding
the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme.”229 The
Court established factors, commonly known as the Roberts test,230 to “determin[e] if the relationship between an organization’s members is sufficiently intimate includ[ing]: ‘the organization’s size, purpose, policies, level
of selectivity, ‘congeniality’ among members, and ‘other characteristics that
may in a particular case be pertinent.’”231 For an organization to successfully
claim the right to intimate association the court must determine whether the
organization is relatively small in size, fostering an intimate relationship that
resembles the characteristics of a family,232 and whether the organization
safeguards the relationship by “carrying on their activities in an atmosphere
of privacy.”233
Distinguishing intimate associations, the Court established the freedom
of expressive association, which is the third and final foundational pillar
supporting fraternal organizations.234 Expressive associations are protected
by the First Amendment to allow groups to engage in “speech, assembly,
petitioning for redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.”235 The
Court noted that the freedom of association “plainly presupposes a freedom
not to associate.”236 To “[i]nsist[] that an organization embrace unwelcome
members directly and immediately affects associational rights”237 but only if
“accept[ing] certain members . . . impair[s] the ability of the group to express those views, and only those views, that it intends to express.”238 Expressive associational rights are implicated if the forced inclusion of unwelcomed members impairs the intended views and messages of the group.239
The first question that must be asked is whether the organization is involved in some form of expressive activity.240 The Court has cautioned that
229. Id. at 617–18.
230. Id.; NAT’L PANHELLENIC CONFERENCE, supra note 81, at 9 (“For the Jaycees, the
local chapters could be quite large with few criteria for membership, generally limited only
by age and sex. The central activities among members were open to strangers. The Court
concluded that the ‘chapters lack the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to . . . exclude women.’”) (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621).
231. Arrowsmith & Tran, supra note 79, at 16 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621).
232. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619–21.
233. Arrowsmith & Tran, supra note 79, at 16 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621).
234. Tran, supra note 27, at 540–41.
235. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618; see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 678
(2000).
236. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 680
(2010) (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623).
237. Id. (quoting Dale, 540 U.S. at 659).
238. Arrowsmith & Tran, supra note 79, at 17 (quoting Dale, 540 U.S. at 648) (quotation
marks omitted).
239. Dale, 540 U.S. at 648.
240. Arrowsmith & Tran, supra note 79, at 17.
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“[i]t is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a
person undertakes,”241 but the activity must be sufficient to bring it within
the protections of the First Amendment.242 The organization’s creed, guidelines, constitution, or bylaws can provide the expressive message;243 the
group does not have to advocate or “trumpet its views from the housetops”
to engage in protected expression.244 Types of “activities that may bear on a
group’s classification as an expressive association include: community service,245 ‘transmit[ting] . . . a system of values,’246 and ‘civic, charitable, lobbying, [or] fundraising’247 activities.”248 Once a court determines that the
activity is expressive in nature, it must look at whether the government’s
action of requiring the group to accept the person as a member impermissibly infringes on the organization’s expressive message.249
The Court has never answered the question of whether a fraternity or
sorority qualifies as an intimate or expressive association.250 Two lower appellate courts, however, addressed the issue and demonstrate that the two
pillars may be perilous.251 In Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity v. University of
Pittsburgh, the fraternity claimed that the University’s failure to recognize
its local chapter violated the fraternity’s intimate and expressive association
rights.252 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied the Roberts test and held that the fraternity is “not the type of association that warrants constitutional protection as an intimate [or expressive] association.”253
In Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City of New York254 the
fraternity claimed that the University’s anti-discrimination policy infringed
241. City of Dallas v. Stranglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
242. Id.
243. Tran, supra note 15, at 5.
244. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 443 F. Supp.
2d 374, 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated, 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Dale, 540 U.S.
at 656).
245. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987).
246. Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
247. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984).
248. Chi Iota Colony, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 391.
249. Arrowsmith & Tran, supra note 79, at 18 (citing Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. at
549).
250. Id. at 17.
251. See Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 438–39 (3d
Cir. 2000); Chi Iota Colony, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 391, vacated, 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007).
252. Id. at 440.
253. Id. at 442; Arrowsmith & Tran, supra note 79, at 17 (“The court held that the chapter
did not meet intimate or expressive association because the chapter was (1) ‘not a particularly
small association,’ (2) was ‘not particularly selective in whom it admitted,’ (3) ‘the national
organization encourages it chapters to recruit new members aggressively so as to continue the
growth of the organizations,’ and (4) the chapter ‘invites members of the public into its house
for social activities and participates in many public University events.’”).
254. 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007).
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on the organization’s right of intimate association due to the university’s
refusal to recognize the organization because it discriminated on the basis of
gender.255 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
fraternity did not meet the standard for intimate association,256 because the
members of the fraternity were not “literally brothers, [sisters, or siblings].”257
The precedent established in Phi Lambda Phi and Chi Iota Colony is
not binding on the other circuits, but it is worth considering when determining whether a fraternal organization meets the standards for intimate or expressive association.258 The associational pillars are the strongest foundational principles on which fraternities and sororities exist; however, they
may be in danger.259 Within the first three months of 2019, three students
filed lawsuits against multiple fraternities and two universities directly challenging the pillars and the single-sex status of fraternities and sororities.260
Stevie Tran and Nathan Arrowsmith agree that the “Roberts test is extremely stringent, and the likelihood that any private organization, fraternal or
otherwise, could satisfy the Roberts test is slim.”261 Despite the outcome of
the lawsuits, the pillars make it expressly clear that the law expresses no
limit on fraternities’ and sororities’ ability to include transgender members.262 Fraternal organizations would do well to pay attention to other antidiscrimination laws’ interpretations of “sex,” including Title IX, Title VII,
and the EPC, and how courts are applying the laws to other non-social organizations in deciding whether to be inclusive.263
III. ARGUMENT
The meaning of the term “sex” as used in Title IX, Title VII, and the
EPC is the “million dollar” question that must be answered to determine
whether transgender students, employees, or individuals are protected under
255. Id. at 139.
256. Id. at 147; Arrowsmith & Tran, supra note 79, at 17 (“The court held the colony did
not meet intimate associations protections because: (1) the colony ‘places no limit on membership size,’ (2) the colony’s purposes were ‘broad, public-minded goals that do not depend
on their promotion on close-knit bonds,’ and (3) the colony involved ‘non-members in several crucial aspects of its existence.’”).
257. Greg Lukianoff, To Survive, Fraternities Need to Stand for Something, Anything,
117 FRATERNAL L., Sept. 2011, at 1.
258. Arrowsmith & Tran, supra note 79, at 17.
259. Tran, supra note 27, at 542.
260. Timothy M. Burke, Lawsuit Filed Against Yale Is an Attack on Greek Organizations, 158 FRATERNAL L., Mar. 2019, at 5, 6.
261. Arrowsmith & Tran, supra note 79, at 17 (“Indeed, the Supreme Court has never
concluded that a private organization of any kind satisfied the Roberts test.”).
262. Tran, supra note 15, at 5.
263. Id.; see also infra Section III.A.

354

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

the discriminatory prohibitions.264 This section begins by arguing that the
courts’ interpretations of sex discrimination under Title IX, Title VII, and
the EPC are shifting.265 The interpretational shift affords greater antidiscrimination protections to transgender individuals.266 This section argues
that the interpretation of “sex” as used in the context of discrimination is no
longer based on the presence of a person’s genitals at birth.267 Rather, it is
more encompassing to include gender identity, thus including transgender
status.268
Fraternal organizations, however, are not bound by the discriminatory
prohibitions of Title IX, Title VII, and the EPC269 and, therefore, are free to
264. Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 288 n.33 (W.D. Pa.
2017).
265. Early Title VII and Title IX case law held that “sex” for Title VII and Title IX is
based on the denotation of male or female genitals at birth. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, 742 F.2d
1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir.
1982). The jurisprudence, however, is shifting to be more inclusive. NAT’L CTR.
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 104, at 3. More courts hold that “sex” under Title VII
and Title IX encompasses gender identity based on the sex-stereotyping framework established in Price Waterhouse. Id.; see Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of
Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1051 (7th Cir. 2017); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339,
351 (7th Cir. 2017); Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730, 744–45 (E.D.
Va. 2018); Anonymous v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 2017); Prowel v.
Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2009); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters.,
Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194
F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999).
266. If the term “sex” is interpreted to mean sex-based for discriminatory purposes under
Title IX, Title VII, and the EPC, then transgender individuals will not be safeguarded by the
anti-discriminatory prohibitions. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 671
(W.D. Pa. 2015). But if “sex” is interpreted to be based on gender identity, the discriminatory
prohibitions will provide a cause of action for transgender discrimination. Whitaker, 858 F.3d
at 1049.
267. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1048. The Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse,
coupled with the decision in Oncale, provide the foundation that Title IX, Title VII, and the
EPC bar discrimination based on all sex-based classification, including transgender status. Id.
(citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 228, 235 (1989); Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998)). Since the Court’s decisions in both cases, only
three Circuits ruled in the alternative—holdings based on precedent predating Price Waterhouse. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007); Ulane, 742 F.2d
at 1085; Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750; see also infra Section III.A.3.
268. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1051; Grimm, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 749; M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ.,
286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 720 (D. Md. 2018); Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134,
139 (S.D.N.Y 2015); see also infra Section III.A.3.
269. Congress expressly carved out historically single-sex social clubs, including fraternities and sororities, from Title IX’s mandates. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (Westlaw through Pub.
L. No. 116-56); see supra Section II.B.2.; infra Section III.B. Title VII only applies to the
workplace. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-56); see supra Section
II.B.3. The Equal Protection Clause does not apply to fraternities and sororities because students and individuals do not have a fundamental right to be in fraternities and sororities, it “is
a privilege.” Michael J. Lenzi, The Trans Athlete Dilemma: A Constitutional Analysis of High
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establish inclusive or anti-inclusive membership policies.270 This section
argues that fraternities and sororities are empowered to use the new era of
inclusivity under the jurisprudence of Title IX, Title VII, and the EPC to
create policies that reflect the fraternal organizations’ true values and the
societal constructs of gender identity.271 This section offers steps fraternal
organizations should take to be more inclusive and to safeguard their singlesex status.272 Finally, this section addresses university policies and the current lawsuits threatening the single-sex status of fraternal organizations.273
A.

Answering the “Million Dollar” Question—“Sex” Includes Gender
Identity

If the term “sex” is narrowly interpreted to mean sex assigned at birth,
transgender individuals will not be safeguarded by the discriminatory prohibitions of Title IX, Title VII, and the EPC.274 By contrast, if the term “sex”
is interpreted to include gender identity “independently or through the theory of sex-stereotyping,”275 then the discriminatory prohibitions will protect
transgender students, employees, and individuals.276 The answer to the “million dollar” question is “sex” should be interpreted to include gender identity, thus including transgender status.277

School Transgender Student-Athlete Polices, 67 AM. U.L. REV. 841, 875 (2018). A
transgender person, however, may have a viable claim against a public university that chooses to recognize a single-sex fraternity or sorority. See infra Section III.C.; Burke, supra note
32, at 3.
270. Tran, supra note 15, at 5; see, e.g., Tran, supra note 27, at 525; Arrowsmith & Tran,
supra note 39, at 2.
271. Tran, supra note 15, at 5–6; see infra Section III.B.
272. JAMES R. FAVOR & CO., FRATERNAL HEALTH & SAFETY INITIATIVE: TRANSGENDER
MEMBERSHIP POLICY GUIDANCE 1 (2017), http://fhsi.jrfco.com/assets/resource---transgendermembership-guidance-update-3-17.pdf; see infra Section III.B.
273. See infra Section III.C. Harvard’s sanction policy, the widespread adoption of allcomers policies by other universities, and the current Yale lawsuits are a “direct attack on
single-sex fraternal organizations” and increase the awareness that fraternities’ and sororities’
future as single-sex organizations is undecided. Burke, supra note 260, at 3.
274. Kyle C. Velte, Mitigating the “LGBT Disconnect”: Title IX’s Protection of
Transgender Students, Birth Certificate Correction Statutes, and the Transformation Potential of Connecting the Two, 27 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 29, 54 (2019).
275. Id.; see generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
276. Velte, supra note 274, at 54.
277. See Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034,
1051 (7th Cir. 2017); see infra Section III.A.1–3.
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Why “Sex” Encompasses Gender Identity—Title IX and Title VII

The Supreme Court has yet to address the “million dollar” question.278
But the majority of lower courts provide an answer to the question by interpreting and applying the sex-stereotype framework established in Price Waterhouse.279 The modern interpretation of sex discrimination under Title IX
and Title VII affirms that sex is based on gender identity and prohibits discrimination based on a person’s transgender status.280 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified School District Number One Board of Education281 articulates a thorough analysis of
why “sex” under Title IX and Title VII is based on gender identity and includes discrimination on the basis of an individual’s transgender status.282
The court in Whitaker, however, expands the analysis beyond Title IX and
Title VII.283 The court establishes why discrimination on the basis of a person’s transgender status is sex-based under the EPC and why a heightened
level of scrutiny applies in determining if illegal discrimination occurred
against a transgender individual.284 Whitaker establishes the answer to the
“million dollar” question.285
In Whitaker the plaintiff, Ashton Whitaker (“Ash”), a transgender 17year-old high school senior filed a claim286 alleging that the Kenosha Unified School District’s (“School District”) unwritten policy preventing him
from using the boys’ bathroom violated Title IX and the EPC.287 The court’s
278. Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 288 n.33 (W.D. Pa.
2017).
279. See, e.g., Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1051; Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, 641
F. App’x 883 (11th Cir. 2016); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir 2011); Kastl v.
Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 F. Appx. 492 (9th Cir. 2009); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204
F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000); Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730, 746
(E.D. Va. 2018); M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 718 (D. Md. 2018).
280. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1034.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1049.
283. Id. at 1050.
284. Id. 1050–54; see infra Section III.A.2.
285. Id. at 1046–50.
286. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1038–39 (“‘Ash’ . . . [had] a simple request: to use the boys’
restroom while at school.”). While Ash’s birth certificate denotes him as female, he began
openly identifying as male his freshman year of high school. Id. at 1040. A therapist diagnosed Ash with gender dysphoria shortly after publicly transitioning. Id. The School District
prevented Ash from entering or using the boys’ restroom because it believed “that his mere
presence would invade the privacy rights of his male classmates.” Id. at 1039. The School
District only allowed him to use the gender neutral or female restrooms. Id. at 1040. The
School District’s rejection of Ash’s transition caused him to suffer from suicidal thoughts and
other mental traumas associated with gender dysphoria. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1039.
287. Id. at 1039 (“In addition to filing suit, Ash . . . moved for preliminary injunctive
relief, seeking an order granting him access to the boys’ restrooms.”). The School District
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Title IX analysis focuses on the “million dollar” question and determines
whether a “transgender student who alleges discrimination on the basis of
his or her transgender status can state a claim of sex discrimination.”288 The
court reiterates that “neither the statute nor the regulations define the term
‘sex’” and that the statute is visibly missing the words biological and gender
identity.289 The statute’s ambiguity requires the court to turn to the Supreme
Court and other case law for guidance.290
Looking at Title VII jurisprudence, the court debates whether to apply
the sex-stereotyping framework established in Price Waterhouse.291 The
debate centers around whether the policy behind the theory only applies to
the stereotypical behaviors of a transgender individual such as the way a
person “walks, talks, or dresses”292—thus, the requirement that a biological
female’s use of the women’s restroom would not be sex discrimination under the stereotyping theory.293 The court, however, rejects the narrow interpretation, reasoning that discrimination on the basis of a person’s
transgender status is sex discrimination because “[b]y definition, a
transgender individual does not conform to the sex-based stereotypes of the
sex that he or she was assigned at birth.”294 The Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of “sex” in Price Waterhouse “intended to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”295 The Court’s interpretation intended to bar discrimination based
responded by filing a motion to dismiss Ash’s complaint, arguing that Ash could not state a
cognizable claim under Title IX or the EPC. Id. The lower court denied the School District’s
motion, which the School District appealed. Id. The Appeal’s Court denied the School District’s motion to dismiss and granted Ash’s injunction. Id. at 1039.
288. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1047.
289. Id. The School District argued that gender identity is not encompassed in the definition of sex under Title IX, and the necessary modifier and interpretation is based on the biological birth-sex of the claimant. Id. But the court debunks the argument by asserting that the
word biological is visibly missing from the statue, in the same way the word gender identity
is missing. Id. The court noted the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning “that Price Waterhouse established that the prohibition on sex discrimination ‘encompasses both the biological differences
between men and women, and gender discrimination, that is, discrimination based on a failure to conform to stereotypical gender norms.’” Id. at 1049 (quoting Smith v. City of Salem,
368 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004)); see also infra Section III.A.3.
290. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1047.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1048.
293. Id.
294. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1048; see also M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 715–717 (citing
Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1048) (rebutting a similar argument, stating the “Supreme Court did
not require gender stereotyping to take the specific form of discrimination on the basis of
appearance or behavior.”).
295. 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1998); see, e.g., NAT’L CTR. TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra
note 104, at 3; Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1048 (noting that in Oncale the Supreme Court confirmed its earlier broad interpretation of sex stereotyping discrimination in Price Water-
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on all sex-based considerations and by definition logically includes discrimination on the basis of an individual’s transitioning status.296
Whitaker’s inclusive interpretation of “sex” is not unsupported.297 The
First, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits all held similarly.298 Each
Circuit decision provides an analysis akin to Whitaker but further recognizes
that “claims of discrimination on the basis of transgender status [are] per se
sex discrimination under Title VII or other federal civil rights law based on
Price Waterhouse.”299 Following the Supreme Court’s guidance, all sexbased discrimination should be barred under Title IX, Title VII, and the
EPC.300 Thus, discrimination on the basis of an individual’s transgender status, at minimum, is based on the societal constructs of gender identity and
includes being transgender, because a transgender person does not conform
to the sex, sex stereotype, or sex-based classification assigned to him, her, or
they at birth.301
2.

Why “Sex” Encompasses Gender Identity—The Equal Protection
Clause

As a threshold matter for an EPC claim, a court must determine what
standard of review applies.302 Regarding the “million dollar” question, the
issue is whether transgender status is encompassed in a sex-based classification or as part of a quasi-suspect class, resulting in transgender discriminahouse). In Oncale, the Court held that “sex discrimination is broad enough to include samesex harassment claims.” 523 U.S. 75 (1998). Considering Oncale and Price Waterhouse
together, courts have increasingly held that Title VII, Title IX, the EPC, and other anti-sex
discrimination laws provide protection to transgender individuals from sex discrimination.
NAT’L CTR. TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 104, at 3; see, e.g., Whitaker, 858 F.3d at
1051; M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 718–20.
296. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1051; see also NAT’L CTR. TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra
note 104, at 10.
297. Id. The Whitaker court is not alone in the determination that transgender individuals
do not confirm to sex-based stereotypes. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316
(11th Cir 2011) (“A person is defined as transgender precisely because of the perception that
his or her behavior transgresses gender stereotypes.”); Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sale,
LLC., 641 F. App’x 883 (11th Cir. 2016); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir.
2004).
298. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730, 744–45 (E.D. Va. 2018);
see, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 351 (7th Cir. 2017); Anonymous v.
Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 2017); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579
F.3d 285, 290 (3rd Cir. 2009); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th
Cir. 2001); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999).
299. M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 714.
300. See Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1051.
301. See id. at 1051; see also NAT’L CTR. TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 104, at 4
(citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000)).
302. Id.; M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 718.
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tion receiving a heightened level of judicial review.303 Whitaker provides an
answer to the “million dollar” question—a heightened level of scrutiny, and
not rational basis, applies to EPC claims because transgender status is based
upon sex.304 Furthermore, in Karnoski, the United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington305 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,306 collectively, expand the decision in Whitaker
and identify transgender people as a quasi-suspect class.307
In Whitaker, the court held the School District’s policy could not be
stated without referencing sex, is logically sex-based, and receives a heightened level of scrutiny.308 This places the burden on the School District to
prove that “the justification for its bathroom policy is not only genuine, but
also ‘exceedingly persuasive.’”309 If the policy cannot justify a sex-based
classification under Title IX or Title VII “by relying upon overbroad generalizations,” then “sex-based stereotypes are also insufficient to sustain a
classification” under the EPC.310 Without addressing the classification of
transgender people, Whitaker held transgender identity is sex-based because,
by definition, transgender individuals do not conform to sex-stereotypes,
thus receiving a heightened level of judicial review.311
The Whitaker decision, however, fails to answer the question of
“whether transgender status is per se entitled to [a] heightened level of scru303. Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 288 n.33 (W.D. Pa.
2017).
304. 858 F.3d at 1051; see also M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 719.
305. Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63563 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 13, 2018).
306. Karnoski v. Trump, 926 F.3d 1180 (2019).
307. See supra authority cited note 178 and accompanying text. In Whitaker, the court
never reached the question of whether transgender individuals are a part of quasi-suspect or
suspect classification. 858 F.3d at 1051. The court held that if “sex” for the purposes of Title
IX and Title VII includes gender identity, then the same concept logically applies to Equal
Protection claims; therefore, transgender status is encompassed in the sex-based classifications and a heightened level of scrutiny applies. Id. at 1051–52.
308. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1051 (“[T]he School District’s policy cannot be stated without
referencing sex, as the School District decides which bath-room a student may use based
upon the sex listed on the student’s birth certificate.”).
309. Id. at 1051–52 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
310. Id. at 1051 (Ash argued that “[t]he School District’s bathroom policy creates a sexbased classification such that heightened scrutiny should apply.”).
311. Id. (“There is no denying that transgender individuals face discrimination . . . because of their gender identity . . . . But this case does not require us to reach the question of
whether transgender status is per se entitled to heightened scrutiny. It is enough to say that,
just as in Price Waterhouse, the record . . . shows sex stereotyping . . . [and] that Ash has
experienced this form of discrimination.”); see also Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316
(11th Cir. 2011); see generally Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir. 2004)
(holding that a transgender firefighter stated a cognizable sex discrimination claim under the
EPC without specifying the applicable level of scrutiny).
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tiny.”312 But, the district court addresses the issue in Karnoski and identifies
“transgender people as one of the most vulnerable groups in our society.”313
The district court applied the Supreme Court’s four-prong criteria and determined that, as a group, transgender people are entitled to suspect classification.314 Thus, transgender people should receive the highest level of judicial review, strict scrutiny.315 The Ninth Circuit, however, vacated and remanded the decision on the basis that the district court applied the incorrect
standard of review.316 Specifically, on remand, the Ninth Circuit instructed
the district court to apply an intermediate level of scrutiny.317 Despite the
Ninth Circuit’s holding, both courts make it clear that transgender individuals are a part of quasi-suspect class and receive a heightened level of scrutiny.318 Furthermore, the analysis the district court applied is almost identical
to multiple lower courts that have held transgender status constitutes a quasi-suspect classification.319
As such, the analysis is relevant and applicable in identifying
transgender people as a quasi-suspect class.320 History reveals that
transgender people suffer and continue to suffer from endemic levels of discrimination in the work place, education, healthcare, and housing.321 A
transgender individual’s ability to contribute to society is not diminished or
altered by the person’s transgender status.322 To determine if a person’s
312. M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 722 n.15 (D. Md. 2018) ((quoting
Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1051) (“[T]his case does not require us to reach the question of whether transgender status is per se entitled to heightened scrutiny.”)).
313. Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63563, at *10
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2018).
314. Id. at *30–32. (holding that: (1) transgender people have historically been subject to
discrimination; (2) transgender people have a defining characteristic that bears no relation to
the ability to perform or contribute to society; (3) transgender people exhibit immutable characteristics; and (4) transgender people are politically powerless); see also supra Section
II.B.2.b.
315. Karnoski, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63563, at *30. Karnoski is the first district court to
hold that transgender status rises to the level of suspect classification. Id.
316. Karnoski v. Trump, 926 F.3d 1180, 1199 (2019).
317. Id. at 1202–1203.
318. Id. at 1199–1200; Karnoski, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63563, at *30; see supra note
178 and accompanying text.
319. Id.; see, e.g., Doe v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 208 (D.D.C. 2017); Stone v.
Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747, 768 (D. Md. 2017); Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp.
3d 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1119 (N.D. Cal.
2015).
320. See supra authority cited note 178 and accompanying text.
321. Karnoski, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63563, at *31–33; Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch.
Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 288 (W.D. Pa. 2017); Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch.
Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 874 (S.D. Ohio 2016); Adkins v. City of
New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
322. See cases cited supra note 321.
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transgender status is immutable, the court must look at whether the “distinguishing characteristic amounts to an unfair branding or resort to prejudice.”323 Some courts agree that “[t]ransgender people clearly have ‘immutable’ and ‘distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete
group.’”324 Furthermore, the modern medical community agrees that gender
identity includes a “biological component” that starts early in life and is
“impervious to external influences.”325 The transgender community is a “tiny minority”326 comprised of “less than one percent of the nation’s adult
population,”327 which results in the group’s underrepresentation in Congress,
the federal judiciary, and state legislatures.328 Therefore, transgender individuals meet the Supreme Court’s four-prong test and constitute a quasisuspect class, receiving an intermediate level of judicial review.329 Whitaker
and Karnoski establish the answer to the “million dollar” question:
transgender status is encompassed in a sex-based classification,330 and
transgender people are a part of a quasi-suspect class.331
3.

Why Courts Holding in the Alternative Are Wrong

The Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits are the only Courts of Appeals
to hold that transgender status is not included in Title VII or Title IX’s discriminatory prohibitions332—“ruling that transgender status, taken alone, is
not entitled to [Title IX or] Title VII protection.”333 The Eighth and Tenth
Circuits’ holdings are based on precedent predating Price Waterhouse,334
323. High Tech Gays v. Def. Sec. Off., 909 F.2d 375, 377 (9th Cir. 1990).
324. Karnoski, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63563, at *33 (“In other contexts . . . the Ninth
Circuit has held that ‘[s]exual orientation and sexual identity’ are ‘immutable’ and are ‘so
fundamental to one’s identity that a person should not be required to abandon them.’”) (quoting Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000)); see also Highland,
208 F. Supp. at 874.
325. Karnoski, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63563, at *33.
326. Highland, 208 F. Supp. at 874.
327. Karnoski, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63563, at *34.
328. Id. (“There are no openly transgender members of the United States Congress or the
federal judiciary, and only one out of more than 7,000 state legislators is openly
transgender.”).
329. Id. at 30–32; Karnoski v. Trump, 926 F.3d 1180, 1201–1203 (2019).
330. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1049
(7th Cir. 2017).
331. Karnoski, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63563, at *11.
332. M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 714 n.7 (D. Md. 2018); see Etsitty v.
Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007); Ulane v. E. Airlines, 742 F.2d
1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir.
1982).
333. M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. at 715 n.7.
334. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 (holding occurred in 1984); Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750
(holding occurred in 1982).
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and these Circuits refuse to apply the sex-stereotyping framework to
transgender status.335 The Seventh Circuit, however, arguably shifted its
approach and applied the sex-stereotype framework in Whitaker.336 The Circuits refusing to apply the framework reason that the framework expands
Title VII’s application beyond the traditional concepts of “sex.”337 Furthermore, a number of district courts refuse to apply the sex-stereotyping
framework and reason that if the term “sex” is to include transgender status,
then the new definition must come from Congress.338 Price Waterhouse and
Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Services,339 however, “eviscerated” this logic.340 Whitaker provides a thorough analysis of why the district courts and
the Eighth and Tenth Circuits’ holdings offer a misguided answer to the
“million dollar” question and are wrong.341
First, Whitaker acknowledges that the Circuit courts’ rulings in the alternative follow precedent predating Price Waterhouse.342 The Supreme
Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse occurred in 1989.343 Immediately following the decision, courts hesitantly embraced the sex-stereotyping frame335. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1221 (citing Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086) (giving deference to the
“common and traditional interpretations” of “sex” for purpose of sex discrimination).
336. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1049. The court’s ruling in the alternative, however, suggest
that “[s]cientific research may someday cause a shift in the plain meaning of the term ‘sex’ so
that it extends beyond the two starkly defined categories of male and female.” Etsitty, 502
F.3d at 1222; see, e.g., Schoer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 212 (D.D.C. 2006); Brown
v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 971 (10th Cir. 1995). The shift started in 1998 and is occurring now.
Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1051 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80
(1998)); see also NAT’L CTR. TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 104, at 4; see supra Section III.A.2. Specifically, in Whitaker, the Seventh Circuit addresses its 1984 decision in
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines and clarifies that the decision pre-dated the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse and Oncale. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1047. The court held the decision “cannot and does not foreclose . . . transgender students from bringing sexdiscrimination claims based upon a theory of sex-stereotyping . . . .” Id.
337. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1221.
338. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 672–79 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086–87) (“[I[f the term ‘sex’ as used in Title VII is to mean more
than biological male or biological female, the new definition must come from Congress.”).
339. Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
340. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000); see, e.g., Smith v. City
of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004).
341. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1049.
342. Id. at 1047. Specifically, courts holding in the alternative follow the precedent established in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines which occurred four years prior to the decision in Price
Waterhouse. 742 F.2d at 1084–85; see Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1221. The courts adhering to the
precedent established in Ulane “narrowly interpret ‘sex’ under Title IX and Title VII to be
sex-based.” Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1221; Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 672–79 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
Whitaker, however, argues that the combined Supreme Court precedent of Price Waterhouse
and Oncale arguably overrule Ulane. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1048–49; see also NAT’L CTR.
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 104, at 4; infra Section III.A.3.
343. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 228 (1989).
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work.344 Nevertheless, in 1998, the Court reaffirmed the policy behind the
framework in Oncale345 and held that Title VII’s “because of sex” language
applied to all claims of sexual harassment, even same-sex harassment.346
Thus, the courts more uniformly started applying the framework to same-sex
harassment,347 sexual orientation,348 and transgender status349—reasoning
that Oncale expressly established that Title IX, Title VII, and other civil
regulatory “laws are not limited by presumed legislative intent.”350 Whitaker
expands on the lower courts’ justifications for applying the framework to
transgender status by addressing the Court’s directive that “Congressional
inaction is not determinative.”351
Congressional inaction or failed attempts to “explicitly add[]
transgender status as a protected characteristic to either Title VII or Title IX,
despite having opportunities to do so,” fails to preclude the lower courts
from inferring that the statute’s “because of sex” language includes
transgender identity.352 A presumption that the legislature’s inaction or
failed attempts to explicitly include gender identity in the definition of “sex”
“lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable inferences
may be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that the existing
legislation already incorporated the offered change.”353 Thus, congressional
344. Shermer v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 937 F. Supp. 781, 785 (C.D. Ill. 1996); Klein v.
McGowan, 36 F. Supp. 2d 885, 889–90 (D. Minn. 1999); Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. CO.,
77 F.3d 745, 751–53 (4th Cir. 1996); McWilliams v. Fairfax Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.
3d 1191, 1195–96 (4th Cir. 1996); Ward v. Ridley Sch. Dist. 940 F. Supp. 810, 812 (E.D. Pa.
1996).
345. Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). The Court in Oncale
acknowledged that “[a]s some courts have observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in the
workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted
Title VII.” Id. But Scalia, writing for a unanimous court, made it expressly clear that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it
is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by
which we are governed.” Id. Thus, holding that “Title VII prohibits ‘discrimination . . . because of . . . sex’ . . . includes sexual harassment [and] must extend to sexual harassment of
any kind that meets the statutory requirement.” Id. at 80; see, e.g., NAT’L CTR. TRANSGENDER
EQUALITY, supra note 104, at 11–12.
346. Id. at 79.
347. Id. at 80.
348. Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 296 (W.D. Pa. 2017).
349. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir 2011); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204
F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000).
350. NAT’L CTR. TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 104, at 10; Whitaker v. Kenosha
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1048 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Oncale,
523 U.S. at 79).
351. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1049.
352. Id.
353. Id. (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990));
United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d
339, 344 (7th Cir. 2017).
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inaction and attempted legislation is not determinative and fails to preclude
lower courts from interpreting that “sex” under Title IX, Title VII, and the
EPC encompasses gender identity and transgender status.354
The answer to the “million dollar” question is that “sex” under Title
IX, Title VII, and the EPC is based on the societal constructs of gender identity and incudes transgender identity.355 The anti-discriminatory prohibitions
of Title IX, Title VII, and the EPC, however, do not apply to the membership practices of fraternities and sororities.356 This raises issues such as what
protections are offered to transgender students like Watson,357 who are victimized by the discriminatory practices of a fraternal organization and
whether the organizations can offer membership to transgender students
without jeopardizing their single-sex status.358 Currently, no legal guidance
exists to inform an organization’s decision to offer inclusivity while maintaining single-sex status.359 Legal scholars and fraternal experts, however,
have devised steps that fraternal organizations can take to be more inclusive
and to safeguard their single-sex status.360
B.

What Fraternities and Sororities Should Do

The first step in safeguarding the single-sex status of a fraternal organization is to establish clear and definitive policies regarding membership
practices.361 “Most organizations do not define the terms ‘male,’ ‘man,’ or
‘woman’ in their documents.”362 Fraternities and sororities failing to define
these terms create issues that leave transgender individuals seeking to join
the fraternity or sorority unclear about whether the organization permits
transgender students to join.363 “Trans[gender] individuals should not have
to show up to every door and out themselves to find organizations that will
accept them.”364 The fraternal organization should define what “male” or
“female” means within the organization’s governing documents and submit
354. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1049.
355. Id.; see supra Section III.A.
356. See supra authority cited note 269 and accompanying text.
357. See supra Part I.
358. See infra Section III.B.
359. See infra Section III.B.
360. See infra Section III.B; see, e.g., Tran, supra note 15, at 5–6; FAVOR, supra note
272, at 3–4.
361. Tran, supra note 14, at 5.
362. Id.
363. Arrowsmith & Tran, supra note 39, at 3 (failing to define the terms also creates
inconsistency in the individual organizations’ applications of the policies to transgender
students).
364. MR Zimmer & Wendi Kinney, Beyond the Binary: From Sisterhood to Siblinghood,
ESSENTIALS E-PUBLICATION, Nov. 2017, at 1, 2.
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the policy to the organization’s host university so that a transgender individual can understand if he, she, or they meet the requirements of membership
and so that the organization itself can apply the policy consistently.365
In order for a fraternity or sorority to maintain associational freedom,
organizations should function as a close-knit family with the “doors and
windows closed to non-members.”366 This note does not suggest that fraternities and sororities keep their governing documents secret but that the organizations limit participation in certain membership practices, such as facilitating recruitment events, voting rights, rituals, and other benefits of being a part of the chapter, to members only.367 A common issue threatening
fraternities’ and sororities’ associational rights and ability to survive the
Roberts test are “auxiliary groups” and the involvement of members of the
opposite sex in recruitment events.368 To safeguard the single-sex status of
the fraternal organization, many national groups, such as the National Panhellenic Conference (“NPC”), created policies that forbid organizational
recognition of auxiliary groups as well as the involvement of members of
the opposite sex, whether the person is a part of another Greek organization
or a layperson.369
Complementary to the associational rights is that the fraternal organization must actually adhere to the policies defined in its governing documents.370 Creating a membership policy is only one step, but following the
policy allows the fraternal organizations to “stand for something.”371 As
Greg Lukianoff, former President of the Foundation for Individual Rights in
Education, suggests, in order for fraternities and sororities to qualify for
associational rights, the organizations must “choose a cause to stand up for
and commit to defending and advocating for it.”372 If a fraternity, on a local
or national level, chooses to define “male” or “female” broadly to include
gender identity, then the organization must respect the policy and determine
365. Id.; Tran, supra note 27, at 528–29.
366. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546–47 (1987);
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618–20 (1984); Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi
Fraternity v. City Univ. of New Yorf, 502 F.3d 136, 144–48 (2d. Cir. 2007); Pi Lambda Phi
Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 438 (3d Cir. 2000); see, e.g., Arrowsmith & Tran, supra note 79, at 17; supra Section II.C.
367. But see Zimmer & Kinney, supra note 364, at 2 (stating that the fraternal organizations should give a copy of their policy on transgender membership to the university or publish it on a website for easy access).
368. UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT, supra note 76 (“Because . . . to protect our right as women-only organizations, sorority women should not serve as members of an auxiliary group or
a subsidiary to men’s fraternities. This can include . . . language such as little sister or daughter of . . . [a] recruitment process, meetings, dues and outward recognition.”).
369. Id.
370. Tran, supra note 15, at 5.
371. LUKIANOFF, supra note 257, at 1.
372. Id. at 2.
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if the candidate for membership meets the gender criteria and any subsequent requirements for membership.373 Timothy Burke urges that “[t]he bottom line is that membership selection decisions should be made in a positive
manner on the basis of the criteria contained in the organization’s governing
documents. Denying membership solely on the basis of some broad category
into which an individual is pigeonholed is an invitation to legal trouble.”374
The legal trouble centers around the potential challenges organizations that
choose not to include transgender status in the group’s membership policy
will face from the growing legal precedent established by state and lower
federal courts that afford greater anti-discriminatory protections to the
transgender community.375
As an alternative to being inclusive, if a fraternity or sorority chooses
not to define “sex” to broadly include gender identity or transgender individuals, the organization is afforded the right to deny such individuals
membership under the same foundational pillars.376 Title IX makes it clear
that fraternities and sororities are not governed by the statute and can choose
whether to include transgender members.377 The constitutional pillars, however, are perilous and less clear.378
“A fraternal organization has a First Amendment right to determine
who is and is not a member, [and,] [i]n the same way a fraternity can say ‘no
women’ and a sorority can say ‘no men,’ both organizations may also say
‘[n]o men/no women means no transgender members.’”379 Fraternities and
sororities should not be forced to include transgender members,380 but the
organizations should examine their governing documents and determine
whether the organization’s history reflects any opposition of transgender
inclusion on any level.381 In addition, before making the decision to be exclusive, the organization should take into consideration the legal aspects of
Title IX, Title VII, the EPC, and the policies of the host university.382 Title
IX and Title VII interpretations are shifting to find discrimination on the
basis of a person’s transgender status as per se discrimination on the basis of
sex stereotypes,383 as with the EPC incorporating transgender status as per se
373. Tran, supra note 15, at 5.
374. FAVOR, supra note 272, at 3; Tran, supra note 27, at 527.
375. Tran, supra note 15, at 5.
376. Id.
377. Id. (“Under the language of Title IX, fraternal organizations have full latitude to say
yes or not to transgender members. Constitutionally speaking, however, the answer becomes
less clear.”).
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Zimmer & Kinney, supra note 364, at 2.
381. Tran, supra note 15, at 5.
382. NAT’L PANHELLENIC CONFERENCE, supra note 81, at 3–4; Tran, supra note 15, at 5.
383. See supra Section II.B.2.
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discrimination on the basis of gender receiving a heightened level of scrutiny.384 As the fight for gender equality continues and the legal developments
progress, fraternal organizations should ask themselves where they want to
see themselves along the arc of this historical and legal development.385
In 2013, Stevie Tran noted that “as transgender people continue to gain
acceptance . . . it is unlikely that their exclusion from fraternal organizations
will continue to go unnoticed.”386 In the six years since Tran made the
statement, the courts’ interpretations and applications of Title IX, Title VII,
the EPC, and other anti-sex discrimination laws have increased the protections afforded to the transgender community.387 The protections have yet to
reach the fraternal walls of any particular organization, but as the issue
presses to the doors of the Supreme Court, it will likely influence the legal
foundation of fraternities and sororities.388
C.

The Greatest Threat to Fraternities and Sororities: The Host University

Currently, the “greatest threat to fraternities [or sororities] choosing not
to permit transgender membership comes from [the] host institutions.”389
Title IX is applicable only to the federally funded host university that recognizes single-sex fraternities and sororities.390 It is important that fraternities
and sororities take the university’s policies into consideration as the university controls procedures and other Greek life events that are subject to the
university’s anti-discrimination policies.391 Two policy approaches affecting
fraternal organizations are an “all-comers policy” and the newly established
Harvard University policy sanctioning students that choose to participate in
unrecognized single-sex organizations.392 The two approaches create con384. See supra Section II.B.2.
385. Email from Dr. Gary Bunn, Dir. of Candidate Serv. & Sigma Phi Epsilon Advisor,
U. of Cent. Ark, to Author (Mar. 11, 2019) (on file with author) [hereinafter Email Dr. Bunn]
When SigEp took [a] hard look at who we are as an organization, we were confronted with a decision . . . [whether to expand membership criteria to African
Americans]. I remember being challenged with the question: Which side of history do you want to be on? With our decision, history would be made as we
chose between exclusivity and narrow-mindedness or inclusivity and acceptance.
Id. If a fraternity or sorority is faced with the decision of whether to be transgender inclusive
or exclusive the organizations will be confronted with a similar decision. The members of the
organization should give serious weight to the issue because their decision will ultimately
determine the side of history they are on.
386. Tran, supra note 15, at 6.
387. See supra Part II.B.
388. Tran, supra note 15, at 5; see Burke, supra note 260, at 4.
389. NAT’L PANHELLENIC CONFERENCE, supra note 81, at 15.
390. Tran, supra note 27, at 523.
391. Burke, supra note 33, at 3.
392. See Nondiscrimination FAQ, supra note 31; HARV. UNIV., supra note 32 at 68–69.
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flicting relationships between the policies and the three legal foundational
pillars of the fraternal organizations.393
An “all-comers policy” is a university policy that requires student
groups to permit membership to all students who wish to join despite the
race, religion, or gender of the individual.394 The Supreme Court determined
that a public university’s decision to require all student organizations to
adopt an “all-comers policy” as a condition for university recognition and
associated benefits is reasonable and viewpoint neutral,395 and therefore does
not violate the First Amendment.396 As such, legal scholar Timothy Burke
noted, “it would be difficult to successfully challenge a public university’s
decision to deny recognition to a fraternity that chooses to . . . [deny membership on the basis of sex],” and until the Court or Congress addresses the
issue directly, the issue will remain undecided.397
The second type of policy that poses a threat to single-sex fraternities
and sororities is Harvard University’s “sanction policy” for students participating in unrecognized single-sex organizations.398 Harvard created the policy with the “aim of dealing with issues of sexual assault, which the university blamed in part on the culture within all-male organizations.”399 The policy
forbids students who “choose” to be a part of unrecognized single-sex organizations from holding leadership positions in any student organizations,
393. See McCarthy, supra note 33, at 5; Timothy M. Burke, Are You Now or Have You
Ever Been a Member of . . . ?, 117 FRATERNAL L., Mar. 2017, at 1, 1.
394. See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661,
671 (2010) (compiling university policies under the umbrella of “all comers” policies).
395. Id. at 669.
396. NAT’L PANHELLENIC CONFERENCE, supra note 81, at 15.
397. Id. Currently, multiple fraternities are suing Harvard, challenging a university policy
that prohibits members of same-sex fraternal organizations from holding school wide office
and from benefitting from school programs and fellowships. Burke, supra note 33, at 17. If
the lawsuits progress, the decisions may well determine fraternities’ and sororities’ ability to
remain single sex. Id. at 19; see also Kappa Alpha Theta, Inc. v. Harvard Univ., No. 1812485-NMG, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134852 (D. Mass. Aug. 9, 2019).
398. Burke, supra note 393, at 1; HARV. U., Policy Regarding Undergraduate Student
Organization,
https://handbook.fas.harvard.edu/book/policy-regarding-undergraduateorganizations (last visited Sept. 11, 2019) (“[A]ny such student who becomes members of
unrecognized single-gender social organizations will not be eligible to hold leadership positions in recognized student organizations or athletic teams” and “will not be eligible to receive College-Administered fellowships.”); U. OF ARK. LITTLE ROCK, Policy for Sex- and
Gender-Based Discrimination, Harassment, and Misconduct Complaints, and Complaint
Retaliation, https://ualr.edu/policy/home/facstaff/title-ix/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2019) (“The
University of Arkansas at Little Rock is committed to providing an environment . . . that is
free from . . . discrimination based upon . . . sex, gender, sexual orientation, [and] gender
identity.”).
399. Jacquelina Tempera, Sororities, Fraternities Sue Harvard University Saying Ban on
Single-Gender Clubs is Unfair to Women, MASSLIVE (Dec. 3, 2018),
https://www.masslive.com/news/boston/2018/12/sororities_sue_harvard_univers.html.
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including being voted captains of Harvard’s intercollegiate athletic teams or
being recommended for thirty-plus scholarships.400 The “sanction policy”
forces students to make the choice of what is more important to them401––
being a part of single-sex organizations or access to privileges and resources.402 The policy caused two fraternities and sororities to disenfranchise
from the organization’s national chapter and become “multi-sex.”403
As of December 3, 2018, three sororities filed lawsuits claiming the
policy violates Title IX, infringes on students’ and single-sex organizations’
First Amendment Rights to intimate and expressive association, and violates
the EPC.404 As of February 12, 2019, “three female students at Yale filed
suit against the University and nine fraternity chapters, their international
organizations, and their house corporations” claiming violation of Title IX,
public accommodation laws, and sexual misconduct.405 Legal scholar Timothy Burke noted that the lawsuit is a “direct attack on single sex fraternal
organizations,”406 but the three foundational pillars offer numerous defenses.407
IV. CONCLUSION
As time goes on, the effect of the lower courts’ decisions in the Harvard and Yale lawsuits may establish a precedent for strict university policies on campuses across the nation.408 Until then, much like other legal implications on fraternities and sororities, “the case law is incomplete, inconclusive, and inconsistent” and it is undecided.409 The ability of fraternities
and sororities to extend membership to transgender individuals, however, is
not undecided.410

400. Burke, supra note 393, at 1; Burke, supra note 33, at 17.
401. See Burke, supra note 393, at 1 (explaining a student’s dilemma between eligibility
for school privileges and a desire to join a same-sex fraternal organization).
402. See Burke, supra note 223, at 3.
403. Tempera, supra note 399.
404. Burke, supra note 33, at 17–19 (“At first blush, that might seem like a strange claim
because Harvard is a private school. In most cases private schools are not required to comply
with the U.S. Constitution in its dealings with students. However the . . . state court complaint bases the argument that Harvard’s students are entitled to the rights protected in the
Constitution of the United States because the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, set forth
in the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, provides those protections by reference.”).
405. Burke, supra note 260, at 4.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. See id.; Burke, supra note 33, at 19.
409. NAT’L PANHELLENIC CONFERENCE, supra note 81, at 11.
410. See supra Part III.
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The “million dollar” question is whether “sex” encompasses gender
identity and transgender status.411 Following the Court’s guidance in Price
Waterhouse and Oncale, the lower courts’ interpretations of sex discrimination provide an answer to the question and why fraternities and sororities are
empowered to extend membership to transgender individuals.412 Title IX and
Title VII intended to bar discrimination based on all sex-based considerations and logically include discrimination on the basis of an individual’s
gender identity and transgender status.413 Under the EPC, the same concepts
apply, and discrimination on the basis of an individual’s transgender status
is sex-based and per se entitled to a heightened level of judicial review.414
Furthermore, transgender people per se constitute a quasi-suspect class and
are entitled to the same heightened level of scrutiny.415 Discrimination on
the basis of a transgender status is per se discrimination under Title IX, Title
VII, and the EPC.416
Fraternities and sororities are empowered to use the new era of inclusivity under the discriminatory prohibitions to create policies that reflect the
fraternal organizations’ true values and the societal constructs of gender
identity.417 We are beyond the days of the evils of discriminating on the basis of sex,418 and if fraternities and sororities remain stagnant on the issue it
could “brand all transgender students with a scarlet letter ‘T.’”419
Transgender students “should not have to endure that at the price of attending their public school,” university, or joining a fraternal organization.420
Fraternities and sororities are empowered to be transgender inclusive.421
Jacob Wickliffe

411. See supra Section II.B.
412. See supra Section III.A–B.
413. See supra Section III.A.1.
414. See supra Section III.A.2.
415. See supra Section III.A.2.
416. See supra Section III.A–B.
417. See supra Section III.B.
418. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998).
419. Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch., 897 F.3d 518, 530 (3d Cir. 2018).
420. Id.
421. Arrowsmith & Tran, supra note 39, at 1.
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